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I. INTRODUCTION
When is a security interest really just a lien that is "effective only
in bankruptcy?" The revised Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code (hereinafter the "U.C.C." or the "Code") accomplished much, but
it also expanded the number of instances in which security interests
have more to do with grabbing the assets of the bankruptcy estate
than they have to do with genuine, arms length bargains. Priority
rules that are meant to remove assets from the bankruptcy estate
rather than to confirm reasonable commercial expectations are ones
that may violate principles found in section 545 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 545 is one of the powers given to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. It allows the trustee to avoid statutory liens that only become
effective when the debtor institutes insolvency proceedings. The the-
sis of this Article is that several of the perfection and priority rules in
revised Article Nine amount to security interests that are really liens
whose practical effects are limited to use in insolvency situations.
While these provisions of the uniform law do not explicitly challenge
section 545, they do amount to stealthy grabs at bankruptcy estate
assets, grabs that would not be part of the ordinary and reasonable
expectations of commercial parties dealing at arms length. As such,
they should be viewed with suspicion in a bankruptcy proceeding.
They also appear to be part of a growing trend. The proposal offered
here is for an examination of U.C.C. priorities in light of commercial
realities and actual bargained-for-exchanges. Bankruptcy policy
should declare preferential an interest that has only one effect, that of
stripping an asset from the estate in favor of a party who did not rea-
sonably rely on it as collateral.
Secured credit is a rather obsessive-compulsive approach to the
problem of repayment. First, one lends money, not just hoping, but
expecting to be paid back.1 The decision to lend is first based on infor-
mation generated and put into use to the end of assuring repayment. 2
Often this credit worthiness evaluation includes credit character and
representation, as well as financial ability. At the same time, the
lender will usually scratch and massage the problem with duties, cov-
enants, conditions, penalties, and various other remedies and punish-
ments for a second layer of protection that will assume the worst, that
is, not only the inability, but the unwillingness to repay the debt.
1. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 45.1-.10 (1965).
2. Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157, 1169-70 (1999).
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These will typically include secondary default rights that will be
needed only if the debtor becomes insolvent.
While there may be times when a contractual dispute, an attach-
ment problem in the parlance of Article Nine, 3 is the root of the trans-
actional breakdown, this will be unusual. Not all disputes arise
within insolvencies, but scratching the surface of the vast majority of
these cases strikes one with a near truism. A solvent debtor will al-
most always repay the loan. The need to establish priorities among
creditors arises outside of bankruptcy only in unusual circumstances.
Even if two secured creditors have a legitimate dispute about who at-
tached and perfected first, this is not worth litigating if the debtor
concedes that both debts are due and owing and the debtor has ade-
quate assets to pay all debts. What dignity right needs to be pursued
if there is sufficient money to pay both? However, add insolvency to
the mixture and defenses that were not relevant loom large when as-
serted by a desperate debtor or the trustee in bankruptcy.
Article Nine of the U.C.C. recognizes this. While attachment is
universal,4 priority focuses on the levels of perfection and on the fail-
ure to perfect. Article Nine uses the bankruptcy trustee as a lien cred-
itor,5 and in the general priority scheme of Article Nine the lien
creditor gets priority over unperfected interests, so that the universal
attachment is not sufficient. 6 Every creditor seeks a state of perfec-
tion to reach the safe harbor against lien creditors, including bank-
ruptcy trustees. 7 This neatly encompasses the bankruptcy trustee
who fills the place of a lien creditor in the priority scheme.8 In this
general priority scheme, the lien creditor has roughly the same prior-
ity value as a creditor who became a secured creditor at the same time
as the creditor became a lien creditor.9 The true competition is that of
perfected (lienor) versus unperfected (lienor).lo Thus, the trustee is
someone whose power is greatest against those who are unperfected.
Conversely, the trustee is least powerful, and will almost always lose,
when competing with those who are perfected.l The trustee's duty is
to seek out the weakness of non-perfection. To accomplish this, the
3. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (2000).
4. See id. § 9-2 01(a).
5. See id. § 9-317(a)(2) (2000).
6. See id. § 9-322 (2000) (discussing the priority of liens).
7. Id.
8. See id. § 9-317 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Id. §§ 9-317, -322 (2000).
11. Id. Into this general priority scheme, the trustee is injected to find and topple
interests that are unperfected, ones that a lien creditor could defeat. 11 U.S.C.
§ 544 (2000) (providing the strong arm provision which reinforces the section 9-
317 rule of unperfected interests losing to a lien creditor).
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trustee has powerful grants that amount to the truism that bank-
ruptcy cares only about those situations in which there is no perfec-
tion. Perfection means little unless the trustee or other lien creditor is
involved. Who cares about priority if there is adequate money to pay
all debts? What the debtor has left, if it is adequate to cover all debts,
will be enough for the secured party. Unless the creditor has an unu-
sual personality, it should not matter the order in which the creditor
is paid so long as he or she is fully paid. What the creditor seeks is
receipt of a full share of the money. It should not concern the creditor
that this is accomplished in any particular order or only after bank-
ruptcy adjudication. However, it should concern the creditor very
much if there is inadequate money to cover the debts and the credi-
tor's priority is low.
This Article will explore two straightforward concepts, one from
bankruptcy, and one from the priority scheme of Article Nine. To-
gether these concepts will show that the current revised version of Ar-
ticle Nine continues and even expands a conflict between Article Nine
and the federal Bankruptcy Code which should cause some Article
Nine provisions to be questioned. The bankruptcy provision is section
545. The expansive approach of Article Nine is most obvious in sec-
tions 9-331, 9-325, and 9-334. This Article is divided into four Parts.
Part I describes the conflict by looking at the origin and scope of sec-
tion 9-306 of the pre-revision version of Article Nine. That section
dealt with proceeds and was seen by the Drafters of the original Arti-
cle Nine to raise the controversy now blossoming within the revised
sections of Article Nine. Section 9-306 generated a number of signifi-
cant cases and this group of cases was recognized to contain at least
one aspect of the conflict that has surfaced. The text of section 9-306
and Bankruptcy Code section 545 will be parsed and several opinions
will be analyzed. Part II lays out the historical understanding of what
constitutes a "lien" under section 545, its origins, and why some liens
are suspect. It will also look at how the U.C.C. Drafters, both the ini-
tial and most recent Drafters, may have viewed this creation of law
and equity, this thing called lien. Part III will explore how and where
the conflict has been expanded and deepened by the 2000 Revision of
Article Nine. In this section, the thesis will be advanced that Article
Nine is knowingly being pushed by the Drafters toward the commer-
cially unsupported proposition that secured creditors should win in
bankruptcy even though they would lose against reliance creditors,
thereby offering the secured creditor a windfall of protection that is
not likely to be the basis of a bargained-for-exchange.
[Vol. 82:607
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONFLICT: A LOOK AT
PROCEEDS UNDER THE U.C.C.
AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
The text of Bankruptcy Code section 545 reads as follows:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor
to the extent that such lien
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor -
(A) when a case under this title concerning the debtor is commenced;
(B) when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title concern-
ing the debtor is commenced;
(C) when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take or takes
possession;
(D) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(E) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a specified stan-
dard; or
(F) at the time of the execution against property of the debtor levied at
the instance of an entity other than the holder of such statutory
lien. 1 2
The elements of the section are: (1) the trustee's power is to (2)
avoid the (3) fixing of a (4) lien to the (5) extent that such lien (6) first
becomes effective (7) against the debtor when a (8) case under this
title concerning the debtor is commenced, or (9) when an insolvency
proceeding concerning the debtor is commenced. This Article will
leave for the moment the additional basis for avoidance stated in sub-
section (2) of section 545.13 This Article will instead begin with a look
at the collateral when it consists of commingled proceeds.
The predecessors of section 54514 were found in section 67 and par-
ticularly subparagraph eight of the former Bankruptcy Reform Act.15
The former law, which will be referred to as the "Act" or "Bankruptcy
Act," was supplanted by the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which
will be referred to as the "Code" or "Bankruptcy Code." Section 67 of
the former Act gave the trustee power to avoid the fixing of some liens.
This power is analyzed by looking at two cases and their progeny.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 545(1) (2000).
13. The statutory language for subsection (2) of § 545 is: "The trustee may avoid the
fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent that such lien...
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the case
against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists." This addi-
tional stumbling block is beyond the scope of this Article.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 545 (2000).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 67 (repealed 1978).
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A. Case Analysis of the Code to Code Connection
Two cases, In re Gibson Products16 and In re Guaranteed Muffler
Supply Co., Inc.,17 illustrate the common understanding of liens in
bankruptcy and commercial law. Judge Hufstedler's opinion in Gib-
son for the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel's should be considered
alongside bankruptcy judge Kahn's opinion in Muffler.19 Judge Kahn
had the advantage of responding to the Gibson opinion while Judge
Hufstedler wrote a ground-breaking opinion in Gibson.20 This Article
starts with Gibson and notes that what the Gibson court felt was a
"collision"2 1 was seen by Judge Kahn in Muffler as an opportunity to
interpret Article Nine in a limited fashion to avoid a "false conflict."2 2
Gibson involved a retailer who became insolvent. 23 The financier,
Arizona Wholesale, sold appliances to the debtor on credit and had a
noncontroversial, perfected security interest in Gibson's inventory by
way of a filed financing statement. 24 Even without an express inter-
est in the proceeds of this inventory, Article Nine gave, and still would
give, Arizona Wholesale an automatically attached and automatically
perfected interest in the proceeds that are collateral. 2 5 Proceeds are
defined as "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, ex-
change or other disposition of collateral." 26 What the former section
9-306(4) attempted to do at one level is noncontroversial. If the credi-
tor could show that its collateral was sold and the proceeds deposited
in a commingled account, the proceeds remained attached as proceeds
so long as they were still "identifiable" by the typical accounting fic-
tions of first-in, first-out or lowest-intermediate-balance. 27 If the pro-
ceeds were identifiable, then they were automatically perfected as
well.28 This allowed the creditor to establish priority and, as impor-
tantly, remain perfected. As noted, a perfected secured party defeats
the trustee in bankruptcy who has the power to avoid unperfected in-
terests29 and preferential transfers.3 0 A preferential transfer is a
16. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976).
17. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5.B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
18. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d at 653.
19. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. at 236.
20. Gibson was decided in 1976. Muffler was decided in 1980.
21. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d at 653.
22. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. at 238.
23. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d at 654.
24. Id.
25. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978); U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2), (d) (2000).
26. U.C.C. § 9-102(64)(A) (2000).
27. Comment 2(a) of U.C.C. section 9-306 (1978) was oblique, but said: "Whatever the
formulation of the rule, the secured party, if he could identify the proceeds, could
reclaim them or their equivalent from the debtor or his trustee in bankruptcy."
28. Id. §§ 9-306(2), -312 (providing a priority rule with the trustee in bankruptcy only
defeating unperfected interests).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000).
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transfer that was made in ninety days (or 120 days under the former
Bankruptcy Act) before the bankruptcy filing and accomplishes an un-
fair advantage for the secured party by preferring the secured party to
other creditors. 3 1 No last-minute change in status means that there is
no preference.3 2
The Gibson court found such a preference in Arizona Wholesale's
attempts to take cash proceeds based on its inventory security inter-
est. Specifically, the court found that the only proven disposition was
a $10 appliance sold within the limitation period of section 9-306(4)(d).
This $10 was deposited into Gibson's account, where it became com-
mingled with other funds in the account. It is not clear from the opin-
ion whether the court found that the $10 appliance was the only
collateral or the only deposit made from collateral sold. It appears
from the opinion that $19,505.27 worth of collateral was sold, al-
though the receipts were not necessarily deposited in the period before
bankruptcy. Only $10 of that amount was proven to be proceeds and
deposited. This interpretation of the court's findings is consistent
with the plain reading of section 9-306(4)(d) as then written.3 3 An as-
sumption that only $10 was proven to be proceeds, although the differ-
ence is insignificant given the court's rationale, is all that is required
for the purposes of this Article. What section 9-306(4)(d) plainly
stated was that the secured party is "limited to an amount not greater
than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor."34 The
Comment to section 9-306 reiterates the language of receipt rather
than focusing on deposit.3 5 This reinforces the assumption here that
the court determined the amount in controversy was the amount re-
ceived rather than the amount actually deposited.36
What complicates the analysis of the former section 9-306 with
which Gibson dealt is the implicit, but rather plain expectation that
accounting fictions will typically be used. The word identifiable was
clearly used by the Drafters as a term of art for those fictions referred
to as "general principles of tracing."37 This is apparent in the ready
acceptance by the courts, such as the Gibson court, that identifiability
30. See id. § 547 (2000).
31. See id. § 547(b) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 60 (repealed 1978).
32. Id.
33. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1976).
34. Id.
35. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) cmt. 2(a) (1978). This comment is essentially identical to the




meant tracing as the Comment suggests and tracing meant the ac-
counting fictions.3S
These fictional accounting methods are called for in section 9-
306(3). That subsection deals with noninsolvency situations. Conse-
quently, it was readily obvious to the Gibson court that subsection (4)
of section 9-306, which uses a complicated, but non-fictional series of
mathematical operations, must have been intended to lead to some-
thing different.39 Subsection (3)'s use of those fictions was seen as a
paradigm and therefore displacement of that paradigm by the state-
ment of a different rule in subsection (4) had to mean that the fictional
tracing was neither intended nor permitted in subsection (4).40 This
language meant a rejection of the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in
Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corporation.41 The Fitzpatrick opinion
used the "proceeds" language to create two tiers of identifiability.4 2
The first level was the identification of the collateral sold as that be-
longing to the secured party, without this identification the money re-
ceived was not proceeds. In the second level, the secured party must
identify the current asset as the progeny of the collateral by the trac-
ing methods appropriate to the inquiry.43
The Gibson court chose not take this conservative approach; in-
stead it advanced an interpretation of commingled as synonymous
with "not identifiable."44 To put it another way, only non-commingled
proceeds were identifiable.45 This seems to be the heart of the Gibson
court's error. "If the cash proceeds could be 'identified,' i.e., had not
been commingled, the secured party would have a perfected security
interest in the whole fund under § 9-306(4)(b), just as he did in the
pre-Code days, without the limitation imposed by § 9-306(4)(d)."46
The next sentence demonstrates the court's mistake. The Gibson
court wrote, "[uinder the code scheme, the secured creditor also has a
perfected security interest under subsection (d) when he cannot iden-
tify his proceeds in a commingled fund, as long as he can show that
some of his proceeds were among those in the commingled fund."47
This error is twofold. First, there is a great difference between "can-
38. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d at 656. Note that the Court relied on Grant Gil-
more's treatise, which lays out the first-in-first-out and lowest-intermediate-bal-
ance methods of "tracing."
39. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d at 656.
40. Id.
41. Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974), superseded by
Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Corp., 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.
1991).
42. Fitzpatrick, 491 F.2d at 1291-92.
43. Id.
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not" and "not allowed."48 The Drafters of Article Nine did not use the
phrase "non-identifiable," which is a true polar opposite of identifi-
able. The Drafters instead used the word "commingled,"49 a comple-
mentary term which could partake of either category of meaning.
That is, the proceeds could either be "identifiably commingled" or "so
commingled as to become non-identifiable."50 Second, the section does
not require deposit, merely receipt. 5 1
Accordingly, the Gibson court erred in not establishing how much
was received on the sale of collateral. This was an "identifiable"
amount. Yet, the statute does not require the court to determine the
amount of the proceeds commingled in the account. Here lies the true
conflict. It was logical for the Drafters to think, Forensic accounting
in bankruptcy is always difficult (recent headlines from Enron and
MCI should convince us that their conclusions, time-honored, are still
relevant). Why not give the secured party, whose collateral has been
sold and whose collateral has demonstrably created proceeds, a shot at
the proceeds received in the last ten days? 52 This would relieve the
secured party of the burden of fulfilling fictions through the cumber-
some and uncertain accounting methods and maybe even achieve a
rough justice.53
While the Gibson court erred in not accepting this as the gist of
Article Nine's provision, the court was justified in its conclusion. The
court understood that section 9-306 rested on a premise at odds with
bankruptcy policy. This opposition is seen if the inverse question is
posed: "Why should the secured creditor who could not have beaten
another secured creditor, because of an inability to trace the proceeds
under § 9-306(3)(b), win against the trustee and unsecured credi-
tors?"5 4 If the lack of perfection, a perfection provided by statute that
48. The language of the Code is to the effect of "not allowed." U.C.C. § 9-306(4)
(1978). Subsection (4) reads as follows: "In the event of insolvency proceedings
... a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
security interest only in the following proceeds: . . . (d) in all cash and deposit
accounts.., in which proceeds have been commingled.., limited to an amount
not greater than the amount ... received within ten days before the ... insol-
vency proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Compare id. § 9-306(3), with § 9-306(4).
51. U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) (2000) stated: "in all cash and deposit accounts of the
debtor in which proceeds have been commingled... (ii) limited to an amount not
greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received ... within ten days .... "
U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1978) (emphasis added).
52. Grant Gilmore, the Chief Reporter of the original version of Article Nine supports
-this as the Drafters' intent. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 26.1, at 678 n.1.
53. Id.
54. This is not a novel question and there has been a good deal of discussion that
such a perfected lien would be a violation of bankruptcy policy. See, e.g., Ven
Countryman, Code Security Interest in Bankruptcy, 4 UCC L.J. 35, 48-49 (1971).
As early as 1954, it was observed that the then-proposed section 9-306(4) would
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is only good in this particular context, is given validity it violates the
spirit, if not the language of the Bankruptcy Code. Why provide these
secured creditors with perfection automatically? This seems justifia-
ble in bankruptcy only if it is determined that the secured party who
lacked perfection deserves to be treated as perfected and given prior-
ity over all unsecured creditors.
In the following section, this question will be explored as part of a
broader policy of commercial and bankruptcy law. It is clear from
both secondary sources and the effect of section 9-306 that it was not
an isolated oversight that Article Nine and the Bankruptcy Code
takes as much as possible from the unsecured creditor. Indeed, the
Code is trending toward expanding the envelope even at the expense
of the contrary bankruptcy policy, and this trend also comes at the
expense of historical Code integrity.
This inherent conflict is highlighted by In re Guaranteed Muffler
Supply Company, Incorporated,5 5 a Georgia bankruptcy court opinion.
Judge Kahn, who decided this case, had -the advantage of the prior
Gibson opinion and thus could address the Ninth Circuit's central
point.5 6 The Muffler court concluded that the section 9-306(2)'s limi-
tation of identifiable proceeds57 meant that the creditor had to first
prove that the interests sought were the "fruit of the sale or other dis-
position ... ."58 No creditor could claim cash proceeds without show-
ing that these proceeds were collected upon the disposition of the
secured party's collateral. Judge Kahn also drew on the Seventh Cir-
cuit's opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Equipment.59 Fitzpat-
rick is the primary support for Muffler and like cases. Although not as
distinct in its linkage about the apparent conflict, it can be viewed as
tethered to the opposite view as Gibson.60 Fitzpatrick impliedly re-
jected Gibson by requiring that any cash proceeds mentioned in sec-
tion 9-306(4) must be from the sale of the creditor's collateral.61
Unlike the Muffler opinion,6 2 the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Fitz-
patrick was not a bare-knuckled disagreement with the Gibson opin-
ion. Nonetheless, the fundamental point of disagreement was clear. 63
likely be attacked for its ten day provision as one giving a preference to creditors
in bankruptcy. Harry R. Levy, Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon
Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 60 COM. L.J. 9, 10 (1955).
55. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
56. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. at 238.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Equip., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974), superseded by
Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Corp., 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.
1991).
60. Fitzpatrick, 491 F.2d at 1292.
61. Id.
62. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. 236.
63. Fitzpatrick, 491 F.2d at 1291.
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And it is this fundamental point of disagreement that points to the
conflict created by Article Nine. If Article Nine's tracing rule had been
intended as an expansion of the amount allowed it would have made
any deposit available, regardless of whether traceable to the secured
party's proceeds. Any cash deposited could have been included as per-
fected in section 9-306(4)(b). On the other hand, Fitzpatrick offered
the more plausible interpretation. It seems far more likely that sec-
tion 9-306(4)(b) was an attempt at "substitution."64 In return for giv-
ing up the right to make a forensic accounting effort, which would
usually be hopeless because of the state of the books of the debtor, it
was seen as better for the secured creditor to be given ten days of pro-
ceeds generated from its collateral. This assumption seems neither
unfair nor outrageous. Money placed into the hands of the debtor,
generated by collateral sales in the last ten days, plausibly might be
still there. 65
The Fitzpatrick court, the more diplomatic court of the two, got the
statutory analysis correct although it left a view of the subsection that
is flawed. What follows in Part IV is proof that the analysis is a clue
to the Code logic replicated in a number of current sections. Unchari-
tably it can be characterized as "grab what you can" advice to the se-
cured creditor in competition with the unsecured creditors. More
prosaically phrased, it encourages the pushing of the envelope by cred-
itors by adjusting fundamental concepts of what is a secured transac-
tion, collateral, and when a security interest is effective. Is it less of a
security device if it is effective only against a single, nearly defense-
less group known as unsecured creditors? If it is only effective against
the lien creditors, and not against the stronger group of secured and
perfected creditors, does it effectively create a security interest valid
only in bankruptcy? If the answer to these questions is "yes," then
Article Nine fosters dangerous behavior by offering a victory over the
trustee that is not available where any other secured party is present.
This victory would be Pyrrhic because this fictional interest in pro-
ceeds has not been shown to come from the secured party's collateral.
Instead, the Drafters permit the secured party this victory without
regard to what proceeds were actually deposited into the account dur-
ing the last ten days.
B. The Conflict Lives on in Revised Article Nine
None other than Grant Gilmore originally noted the problem in his
1962 text on Article Nine. His comments, though bleak, proved pro-




the former Uniform Trust Receipts Act (hereinafter the "UTRA").66
He wrote in his landmark text:
It appears, however, that the 'mere' claim to proceeds can be promoted to
something more than a 'mere' claim and that, when this is done, the first sen-
tence and not the second will regulate the priorities. Unfortunately, there is
nothing in the statutory text that states at which point the 'mere' claim be-
comes something more than 'mere.'6 7
This provision on commingled proceeds had a predecessor in the
old UTRA and Professor Frank Kennedy identified the UTRA contro-
versy in a 1962 article. 68 Professor Kennedy noted that the provi-
sion's effect, one only seen in bankruptcy, made it vulnerable to
criticism. Had it been given a broader effect, one beyond bankruptcy,
it might have survived the scrutiny given the provisions that dispro-
portionately affect bankruptcy.6 9 If the security interest was effective
outside of bankruptcy as a limitation on the identifiability principle of
section 9-306(3) and further limited that automatic interest, it would
be less suspicious. 70 Heightened suspicion should be expected if sub-
section (4) is viewed as an expansion of what was a limited lien in
subsection (3).71 Then add to it the factual predicate of insolvency 72
and it becomes difficult not to smell a preference, even if it is one cre-
ated by statute rather than the parties.
Here is the significant tension that the Drafters attempted to re-
lieve with what became the 1972 amendments to Article Nine. As
originally written, section 9-306(4) was an unpretentious, but thor-
ough grab at insolvency assets. What was not "a perfected interest" in
the proceeds 73 became perfected and available upon insolvency, lim-
ited to a shortened ten-day time period. Partly because of the UTRA
history74 and its influence on the early Code cases, the Drafters radi-
cally rewrote section 9-306(3) for the 1972 revision. The revised sub-
section made available what had been unavailable. Because of the
difficulty in using the accounting fictions to identify and trace collat-
eral, the Drafters made these assets available as proceeds even
though there was no direct perfection in the proceeds as collateral.7 5
66. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 27.3, at 728-29.
67. Id. § 27.3, at 730.
68. Frank R. Kennedy, Impact of the UCC on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 CoM. L.J. 113
(1962).
69. Id. at 117.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1962) (providing in its introductory clause: "In the event of
insolvency proceedings .. .
73. Id. § 9-306(3) (1962).
74. For a good history of the UTRA problem, see Richard W. Duesenberg, Lien or
Priority Under Section 10, Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 2 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 73 (1960). For a discussion of the origins of section 9-306(4), see id. at 83-84.
75. U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1972).
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The trade-off was the ten-day-limitation. Thus, it appears, reasona-
bly, that the Drafters took seriously Professor Kennedy's advice.76 As
a limitation on an interest that was theoretical rather than practical,
but was at least theoretically probable, the new section did not "grant"
anything and therefore might not have been seen as preferential. 7 7
Yet, this became the Code's view. From 1972 through the 1978 revi-
sion, the provisions remained static, while the controversy was stirred
by Gibson,78 Muffler,7 9 and similar cases. With the 2000 revision,
others began to question whether the problem was one of comprehen-
sion or simple greed.8 0
The current proceeds section, section 9-315, has dropped the differ-
ential treatment in bankruptcy81 So, the question about the charac-
ter of the former section 9-306(4) as a substantial and important
provision in the debate about permissible preferential transfers has
lost some of its strength.8 2 Section 9-315 avoids the debate by al-
lowing the new lien to become available in all contexts and only after
linking the security interest to the creditor's collateral through trac-
ing. The cryptic current statement is that "the debtor's entry into
bankruptcy does not affect a secured party's right to proceeds."83 Of
course, the question is how to treat proceeds. It is now the task of
every secured creditor to be prepared to identify proceeds, which will
necessarily include forensic accounting, which at one time could be
avoided through use of the former section 9-306(4). Section 9-315 and
its current comments are explicit that it is the burden of every secured
party who claims an interest in proceeds to make that identification
through the fictions of tracing s 4 The lowest intermediate balance
rule is even mentioned in the current commentary to the section.8 5
What controversy that was lost in going from section 9-306 to section
9-315 has been heightened in other provisions of the new and revised
Article Nine in its year 2000 version.
Any change to Article Nine must take into account both existing
bankruptcy law and its policies. For instance, section 545 only deals
with statutory liens, but because Article Nine is a statute, the Draft-
ers must be at least cognizant of the limitation set forth in that sec-
tion. In addition, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code attacks
76. See Kennedy, supra note 68, at 116-17.
77. See id.
78. In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1978).
79. In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 5 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
80. Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Greedy? 104 COM. L.J. 241, 260-
64 (1999).
81. U.C.C. § 9-315 (2000).
82. Id.; see also id. § 9-315 cmt. 8.
83. Id. § 9-315 cmt. 8.
84. Id. § 9-315(b).
85. Id. § 9-315(b) cmt. 3.
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preferences generally and raises the deeply confused question of what
is not an actual "preference." Given the nature of security as the fall
back position after a debtor's failure to pay, it is obvious that any se-
curity interest that is successful must survive bankruptcy. Only in
bankruptcy is the issue of preference and statutory liens inquired into
by virtue of the policies of Bankruptcy Code sections 545 and 547. Be-
cause the classic test of perfection is one with peculiar meaning in
bankruptcy, this is where the test of a security interest really should
be made.8 6 Congress can change this all by amending statutory defi-
nition sections. For instance, the judicial lien, which is defined in 11
U.S.C. § 101(53), defines statutory liens and can be easily modified by
adapting the transfer definition of § 547(e)(1)(b), which will add bona
fide purchaser or judicial lienor as those who will defeat a "nontrans-
fer." In other words, it can be expanded to make a transfer effective
only when a bona fide purchaser cannot also be defeated.
From 1950 to 1960 Article Nine and the Bankruptcy Act existed in
parallel, but different, universes. They were akin to distant radio
wave transmissions, competing for air space, but nothing close to ap-
proaching dialogue.8 7 This changed with the drafting of Article Nine
followed by its promulgation in 1962. During this period, the Drafters
of Article Nine were well aware of the bankruptcy chiaroscuro and laid
down over this what they conceived of as a complementary foreground
of commercial transactions. They took into account the need to avoid
preferential transfers. Of course, the primary concern was validation
of the floating lien that seemed to be a political necessity, as well as a
commercial reality, to the Drafters.8 8 Thus, the Drafters' understand-
ing of the history and intent of the Bankruptcy Act, and later the
Code, is critical for understanding Article Nine itself. To better under-
stand what the Drafters were thinking, the following Part explores
the bankruptcy law background to this uniform commercial law draft-
ing effort.
III. THE HISTORY AND INTENT OF SECTION 545
There are four stages of development in bankruptcy which, when
understood as sequential, makes clear the nature of the current sec-
tion 545's limitation on Article Nine and even more importantly better
explains the broader clashes of policy between the two sets of laws.
86. A purchaser for value will defeat either interest. See id. §§ 9-320, -330, -331; 11
U.S.C. § 544 (2000).
87. See generally Gilmore, supra note 1, § 45.7, at 1322.
88. See id. § 45.7, at 1322-25.
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A. Stages One and Two: The 1898 Bankruptcy Act and Its
Revisions
The original Bankruptcy Act was a creature of the emerging econ-
omy of the late 19th century. Many of the current industrial and re-
tail patterns were only foreshadowed and many were even
inconceivable at the time of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898. In this Act it
is fair to say, though perhaps overgeneralized, that the trustee took
the estate as the debtor held it.s9 The trustee essentially stepped into
the shoes of the debtor as surrogate for the debtor. The trustee's job
was to close the business and make what payments could be made
with little room to aggressively administer.90 With a couple of major
exceptions, this is the overgeneralized but fair statement of the trus-
tee's role between 1898 and the 1938 revision of the Act.91
It became the task of the 1938 Drafters to acknowledge and vali-
date this acceptance of judicial liens and statutory liens as part of the
landscape the trustee would have to accept. Former section 67 of the
1938 Act recited Congress' acceptance of both types of liens and re-
solved the developing customary law over the ability to create a lien or
to perfect a lien after the intervention of the bankruptcy filing.92
While the 1938 revision resolved several controversies that had devel-
oped in the first forty years, it was not radical. Contemporaneous
with the developing reservation about the power of liens and state
control over those liens, this revision was more reactive than innova-
tive. Clearly, Congress was considering the Depression and the
overuse of liens by the states, without a rejection of the liens them-
selves. It appears that it was the abuse, not the mere existence, of
liens by taxing authorities and landlords that played a heavy role in
Congress' reaction.93 There was a growing sense that liens, if not con-
tained, would expand to the point that there would be nothing for un-
secured creditors and perhaps even bankruptcy fees of administration
would go unpaid.9 4
Although the principle of validating judicial and statutory liens
continued to govern after the 1938 Act, the notion of invalidation be-
gan to solidify, if not take hold.95 The Chandler Act of 1938 presaged
the true break. Using the structure of section 67(c) of the Chandler
Act, the 1966 amendments to the Chandler Act completed the shift to
89. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 545-16 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. 2001).
90. See id. Perhaps most significant was the right of the trustee to preserve an inval-
idated interest, subrogate to them and then attack other interests vulnerable to
the invalidated interest. These were found in sections 60, 67, and 70 of the for-
mer Act. See id.
91. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 60, 67, 70 (1938).
92. See COLLIER, supra note 89, at 545-16, -17.
93. See id. at 545-18.
94. See id. at 546-15, -16; see also GiLMoRE, supra note 1, § 45.3, at 1288.
95. See COLLIER, supra note 89, at 545-16, -17.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
invalidation. The 1966 amendments, which coincided with many of
the Article Nine promulgation and enactment debates, brought to-
gether the two bodies of developing law and heightened the reserva-
tions about liens and their role in bankruptcy. For the first time
Congress undertook to describe some liens as "invalid,"96 rather than
"postponed or subordinated."9 7 This was a dramatic shift away from
what had been a fostering attitude toward liens, a policy present from
1898 through the early 1960s. It set the stage for the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code and outlined the policy issue that would confront the
Drafters of Article Nine during the late 1960s and for the 1972 revi-
sions of Article Nine.9 S It also helped shape the discussion that sur-
rounded the adoption of Article Nine by the various states during the
middle-to-late 1960s.
B. The Third Period: The 1966 Amendments and Revised
Article Nine and the Emergence of the Present
Conflict
This third period encompasses the dance of Article Nine and bank-
ruptcy law in which each system sought position on the national floor
of policy. Both cooperated with the other while attempting to estab-
lish position, preening and posturing to establish the final policy that
each carried as the two reached something akin to equipoise. This
point came when section 545 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was laid
over the top of the 1972 revisions to Article Nine. The Article Nine
2000 draft continues this dance, but shifts into a new period of con-
scious advantage taken by the Article Nine Drafters. The remainder
of this Part of the Article illustrates that this dance of mutual respect
and advantage taking has been replaced with one in which Article
Nine has taken the upper hand. First, consider the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978, the most important revision since the 1898 original Act. A
good illustration of the equilibrium reached during the 1960s and '70s,
or perhaps "dynamic tension" is a better phrase, is section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which answered Grant Gilmore's most fundamental
concerns in his 1965 treatise. Gilmore was concerned about the fun-
damental programmatic issue of Article Nine's floating lien which he
believed to be at risk,99 because of bankruptcy's rejection of all prefer-
ential transfers. 0 0 In 1978, the Bankruptcy Code accepted the float-
ing lien of Article Nine as not preferential,101 and bankruptcy even
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 67(a) (1966).
97. See id; COLLIER, supra note 89, at 545-19, -20.
98. Gilmore felt that the developing conflict was worthy of mention in the final chap-
ter of his treatise. See generally GILMORE, supra note 1, § 45, at 1281-1346.
99. See id. § 45.7, at 1318-20.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1978).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (2000).
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adapted its preference law to Article Nine by using the nomenclature
of "perfection" within the section.10 2
Even with this significant bow to Article Nine, the Bankruptcy
Code replaced section 60 in significant part with section 547 and left
no room to wonder about the development of bankruptcy law and its
growing distaste for statutory liens that become valid only upon insol-
vency and that eviscerated the estate. The combination of devices
adopted by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was acceptance of Article
Nine's security interest because it was based on consent while re-
jecting "nonconsensual" liens. The developing law made clear that
most of the liens in the context of landlords and taxes had been statu-
tory and nonconsensual, while the U.C.C.'s version of its security in-
terest, even though a product of state law, was based on consent. The
Bankruptcy Code now contains a definition of lien that makes this
clear:
(53) "statutory lien" means a lien arising solely by force of the statute on spec-
ified circumstances or conditions, or lien of distress for rent, whether or not
statutory, but does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not
such interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on the statute and whether
or not such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute; 1 0
3
First, this definition eliminated judicial liens from the questing
reach of section 545.104 Second, it made explicit the origins of bank-
ruptcy's distrust of liens in the greed of state legislatures who chose to
tip their hands at insolvency. Call it a variation on the secret lien, so
thoroughly despised in bankruptcy. This definition meant that a stat-
ute could not provide for an interest that became valid only upon in-
solvency without running afoul of section 545. Yet, there remains a
substantial disconnection here that leads to the frisson of the Bank-
ruptcy Code/U.C.C. dance. The challenge laid down by the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act was to the Drafters of Article Nine to craft a
security interest that arose by consent yet attached and became per-
fected as to certain goods only upon insolvency.
Was it enough that there was a consensual relationship as to the
collateral which, when sold, generated proceeds and therefore could be
attached automatically? Did Article Nine's automatic attachment and
perfection in favor of the secured party go too far? As a result of these
questions, the 1962 version of section 9-306(3) and (4) was quite sus-
pect. Absent insolvency under the 1962 Code, that is, in the typical
situation between the debtor and secured party, there was no attach-
ment and therefore no perfection in the commingled proceeds. 0 5
Only segregated noncommingled proceeds were available to the se-
102. See id. § 547(e)(1)-(2).
103. Id. § 101(53).
104. See COLLIER, supra note 89, at 101-47, -48, -48.1.
105. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) (1962).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cured party unless the security agreement provided otherwise. Upon
insolvency, the secured party was able to dip into the commingled
cash receipts without regard to what category of collateral was speci-
fied in the security agreement.' 0 6
Gilmore suggested a defense of this 1962 scheme,' 0 7 but the Code
moved on and the 1972 revisions set up the Gibson and Muffler con-
flict by making commingled proceeds available outside of insol-
vency.10 8 The 1972 revisions sidestepped Gilmore's initial question
and defense, but did nothing to resolve the underlying question. No
longer could it be said that the Code offered a lien valid only in bank-
ruptcy.O 9 Yet, even after the 1972 revisions the inherent criticism
remained. Article Nine offered a perfected security interest in com-
mingled accounts without proof of identifiability.11o No such security
interest in commingled accounts was available outside bankruptcy un-
less there was some identifiability. Identifiability was no more than a
fictional accounting, at least outside of insolvency, a presumptive trac-
ing that suggests strongly the role of the secured party's collateral, but
which does not truly separate and assign the proceeds as physically
the property of the creditor."' The 1972 amendments to section 9-
306(4) were to Gilmore a cutting back, a limitation, by the restriction
of the interest to those proceeds received during the final ten days.1 12
This appears to be the only defense available after the 1972
amendments.
While the 1972 amendments to Article Nine were intended to ad-
dress the weakness by expanding the section 9-306 interest to com-
mingled proceeds, outside of insolvency they should be seen in context.
The substantive fix of 1972 came at the end of twenty years of linguis-
tic gloss in which Gilmore and the other Drafters tried to work around
the teachings of the bankruptcy cases under the UTRA. The direct
lineal antecedent of Article Nine, 1 13 the UTRA, gave a similar right to
trace to the entruster.1 4 Article Nine first limited the UTRA to only
"cash proceeds received."115 Perhaps more importantly, while the
Drafters of Article Nine adapted the language of the UTRA to Article
106. See id. § 9-306(2)(3).
107. See generally GILMORE, supra note 1, § 45.9, at 1341-43.
108. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1972).
109. See Vern Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 UCC L.J. 35, 47
(1971); Harold Marsh, Jr., Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amend-
ments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REV. 681, 715-16 (1967).
110. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1972).
111. See id. § 9-306(3) cmt. 2.
112. See GILMORE, supra note 1, § 45.9, at 1339-40.
113. See id.
114. See UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 10(c) (1933). It is important to think secured
party instead of entruster by "entitlement" to proceeds received within ten days
before insolvency.
115. U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1972); GILMORE, supra note 1, § 45.9, at 1341.
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Nine, they clarified the UTRA concepts to avoid some of the previous
interpretations.
Drafted during the 1920s when bankruptcy would permit almost
any lien and validate it, the UTRA was not controversial, even when it
provided the entruster a "priority." It did not matter that the interest
granted appeared like the creation of the lien with special priority
only in bankruptcy. The time frame of the 1920s and the relatively
undeveloped policy of bankruptcy permitted this overreaching by the
UTRA. This became untenable as bankruptcy policy matured. With
maturation, the UTRA became more controversial and the Code Draft-
ers changed the language to make clear that no special treatment, no
special priority, was extended. Rather than seek a special priority as
the UTRA seemed to, Article Nine spoke in terms of attachment and
perfection of a garden variety security interest which would depend on
other provisions for its "priority."116 Thus, the Drafters avoided the
loaded language of priority which had drawn the attention of bank-
ruptcy scholars and courts during the decades prior to 1960. Gil-
more's defense along these lines, written in the early 1960s, offered a
plausible account and reasonable differentiation between the UTRA
and Code, but it did not sell.1 ' 7
Why this defense did not sell is straightforward. There was a seri-
ous disconnect between the maturing concern in bankruptcy law and
the rather facile linguistic fixes offered by the Drafters. The Bank-
ruptcy Code of 1978 saw this problem for what it was, a preference
given to the secured party available only in bankruptcy. This is true
because the collateral in which the secured party had its original in-
terest no longer existed. What was now present in the insolvency
were only proceeds. Absent bankruptcy, there was no such interest
available to the secured party. While changing the language from
"priority" to "perfected security interest," section 9-306(3) got rid of
the loaded language of the UTRA, it did not answer the fundamental
question of why the secured party, who had not bargained for or
achieved a consensual interest in cash proceeds and would not have
such an interest outside of bankruptcy, should receive an interest in
cash proceeds in the bankruptcy proceeding. The linguistic fixes of
section 9-306(3) and (4) addressed the conflict in terms of the lineal
ancestor statute and the cases under it, but they did not adequately
address the policy of bankruptcy law as it developed.
Some proof of this is in the removal of section 9-306(4) in the cur-
rent version of the Code,118 the 2000 revision. In the 2000 revision of
the U.C.C., the secured party gets the same interest inside bank-
116. See GiumoE, supra note 1, § 45.9, at 1342-43.
117. Witness the controversy generated by the Gibson and Muffler split. See generally
supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
118. U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 8 (2000).
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ruptcy as out. This is the current statement of the proceeds role in
section 9-315. This section offers a perfected security interest only in
proceeds identifiable by the secured party, that is traceable proceeds,
and does not differentiate between non-insolvency and insolvency
situations.119
C. The Fourth Period: Post-1978 Bankruptcy and Post-1972
U.C.C. - How the Code Arrived Here
The fourth period is that which overlaps the post-1972 and 1978
Article Nine revisions and the post-1978 Bankruptcy Code revision.
When courts split over section 9-306(4), they were left to choose be-
tween bankruptcy policy and Article Nine policy. This fourth period
ended with the 2000 revision of Article Nine, which resolved the split
by eliminating the insolvency preference for commingled proceeds.
While this might be seen as a concession or even a capitulation by the
Drafters, it is important to look at what was happening elsewhere in
Article Nine before reaching this conclusion.
In this Fourth Period, it became obvious that Judge Hufstedler and
the Gibson position had been influential, but the substitution ap-
proach of Fitzpatrick was accepted as the basic interpretation of sec-
tion 9-306(4).120 While judges mention the Gibson opinion and its
argument that tracing still applies in the section 9-306(4) insolvency
context121 it has become clear that the Fitzpatrick court's decision has
captured the day.12 2 This means, that for the most part, when a se-
cured creditor found itself making a claim to proceeds in an insolvency
proceeding he or she was limited to the amount actually deposited in
the commingled account in the ten days just prior to the insolvency
119. See id. § 9-315.
120. See Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293, 1300 (10th Cir. 1986).
121. See, e.g., Stoumbos v. Kilimnik, 988 F.2d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 1993); Maxl Sales Co.,
796 F.2d at 1300; Charter First Mortgage, Inc. v. Oregon Bank, 56 B.R. 838, 849
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985). With the exception of the two decisions from the Ninth
Circuit that stated Gibson to be controlling precedent, there is little regard paid,
more a tip of the judicial hat, to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
122. See, e.g., Maxl Sales Co., 796 F.2d at 1300; In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club,
Inc., 205 B.R. 407, 412-13 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); In re Mark Twain Marine
Indus., Inc., 115 B.R. 948, 951-52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Intermountain
Porta Storage, Inc., 74 B.R. 1011, 1013-14 (D. Colo. 1987); In re Datair Systems
Corp., 42 B.R. 241, 244-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Trans-Texas Petroleum
Corp., 33 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983). In addition, although dicta, be-
cause no commingling occurred or because of some other reason section 9-306(4)
was not applied, these courts suggest that Fitzpatrick rather than Gibson is the
better interpretation. See, e.g., In re Buesinger, 2000 WL 33960803, at *3
(Bankr. C.D. Ill 2000); In re Armstrong, 56 B.R. 781, 787-88 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986); In re Mewes, 56 B.R. 108, 111-12 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985).
[Vol. 82:607
2004] ART. NINE PRIORITIES, PREFERENCES, & LIENS 627
proceeding's institution.123 This suggests that the lobbyists and draft-
ers in the revision process leading to the 2000 amendments decided to
redirect the courts. Without much explanation in the comments, the
Code has done away with the ten-day limitation and returned to the
common law methods of tracing for all commingled funds.1 24 The his-
torical analysis leads to this question: Did the 2000 revision return to
the common law or run from the limited efficacy of the 10-day limita-
tion as it had come to be viewed in bankruptcy proceedings?
III. CRACKING THE CODE LOGIC: LIENS AT COMMON LAW,
LIENS IN REAL ESTATE, AND THE COMMON LAW
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
To illustrate the Code logic involved in Article Nine, this section
will take up two different classifications of collateral and breakdown
the perfection and priority rules attendant to those transactions. The
first category is fixtures and the second is that of negotiable instru-
ments. Both are instances in which there has been a significant evolu-
tion in the Code provisions, yet very little explanation of the need for
change. In both situations, the modifications made by the Drafters
are offered on the basis of clarification and developing commercial
practices. This section first discusses fixtures, a classification that
has drawn a good deal of attention from the Drafters and has resulted
in significant and complex revisions. The area of fixtures illustrates a
Code judgment that either there is a need for revision or the cases
have in fact reached essentially the same conclusion without the revi-
sion. In other words, the revision duplicates or replicates what the
Code had led the courts to decide in first place. In the second area,
that of negotiable instruments, the changes wrought are substantial
but are even more lacking in rational explanation of the need for the
particular changes made. What is troubling about both areas is that
while both presented issues, the Drafters went to great lengths to ad-
just provisions in ways that affected settled issues, as well as the pur-
portedly unsettled issues identified for treatment.125
123. See, e.g., Maxl Sales Co., 796 F.2d at 1300; In Re Buesinger, 2000 WL 33960803,
at *3; In re Oriental Rug Warehouse Club, Inc., 205 B.R. at 412-13; In re Mark
Twain Marine Indus., Inc., 115 B.R. at 951-52; In re Intermountain Porta Stor-
age, Inc., 74 B.R. at 1013-14; In re Armstrong, 56 B.R. at 787-88; In re Mewes, 56
B.R. at 111-12; In re Datair Sys. Corp., 42 B.R. at 244-45; In re Trans-Texas Pe-
troleum Corp., 33 B.R. at 69.
124. See U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 3 (2000). Perhaps most germane, comment 8 of section 9-
315 cryptically states: "This Article deletes former Section 9-306(4), which dealt
with proceeds in insolvency proceedings. Except as otherwise provided by the
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's entering into bankruptcy does not affect a secured
party's right to proceeds."
125. In addition to these two areas, the new sections dealing with the problem of
transferred collateral are also of concern. Transferred collateral can occur by
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Of the two examples offered here, it is fixtures that have the long-
est and most controversial history. For this reason, it is difficult to
call the current state of the Article Nine fixture provisions an outright
grab by financiers against interests in bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the
subtlety introduced by multiple layers of problems and statutory fixes
does not disguise the current advantage given to Article Nine secured
parties over the trustee in bankruptcy and therefore the general lien
creditor. A discussion of the foundation in the origin, definition, and
concept of a "lien" is important in understanding this advantage.
A. A Short History of Liens
The security device that has become known as a lien existed long
before the name lien "attached" to it.126 One document indicates that
the Greeks and Egyptians used liens as early as 537 A.D.127 Accord-
ing to the New Oxford American Dictionary, the word lien originated
in the mid-16th century around 1531 from the Middle French via the
old French word loien.128 Loien is itself derived from the Latin
ligamen meaning bond.129 The Latin ligamen more precisely refers to
sales of assets and by the debtor, transmuting itself into a new debtor yet retain-
ing the collateral that was subject to the security interest granted by it in its
former guise. This had been handled in section 9-402(7) (1978) as part of the
misleading changes and amendments section.
This problem is laid out in four provisions, sections 9-325, 9-326, 9-507, and 9-
508. These are collectively known as the new debtor problem. This problem
arises when a debtor who is already committed to a secured transaction with one
creditor changes its structure to such a degree that it is in effect a new entity and
then enters into a new transaction with a second secured party. To the extent the
new entity has collateral that would have gone to the first secured party, but is
now claimed by the new secured party, there is an intractable conflict. The new
Code resolves this by giving priority to the former debtor not only as to trans-
ferred collateral but all collateral acquired within four months of the change.
While this seems "fair," to split the collateral, it ignores the classic problem of
attachment and perfection. There cannot be perfection and priority without first
having attachment.
A look at the cases to which the Drafters were responding to shows that there
is no "good" and demonstrably fair answer, but the one chosen seems particularly
bad because it ignores the classic Code logic and therefore is fundamentally
flawed with little or no explanation for the change. The glaring explanation is
that this result is hard on the second creditor, but even harder on the trustee in
bankruptcy. It is the trustee who loses all chance at the assets, further diminish-
ing the estate without genuine reliance on the new debtor's assets by the old
secured party, who if he had relied could simply have asked for a new security
agreement and avoided the whole problem.
126. Pun intended. Sorry.
127. TRAIANos GAGOS & PETER VAN MINNEN, SETTLING A DIsPUTE: TOWARD A LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LATE ANTIQUE EGYPT 23-26 (1994).
128. THE NEW OxFoRD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 985 (2001).
129. What is the Roman law concept of a lien? Liens have existed since ancient times.
In Rome, liens came in three forms: (1) pignus; (2) hypothec; and (3) true lien or
ius retentionis. The first of these versions of lien, pignus, was what is known in
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a fasten, tie, string, or a bandage.13o Ligamen results from the combi-
nation of the word ligo, meaning fasten and when combined with
something specific, implied a bandaging of wounds or something simi-
lar.1 31 The suffix men indicated non-abstract objects. 13 2
Conceptually, liens arose out of the sense of natural equity to se-
cure a marketplace that revolved around barter.133 They satisfied the
vendor's need for security for payment or for services rendered or
goods sold.134 Essentially, a lien was an agreement between a buyer
and seller that the one who labored or the one who sold goods would
retain possession of the specific article upon which his time, labor, and
energy were expended until the seller received compensation. 13 5
A lien could arise in one of two ways: (1) from the voluntary per-
formance of labor upon the property of another while in the debtor's
possession or (2) from the imposition by law or custom of a compulsory
duty upon the party in his favor it operates. 136 The various meanings
of the word "lien" including its origins, its usage in English common
the law today as a pledge. See W.W. BucKLAND & ARNOLD D. McNAIR, ROMAN
LAW AND COMMON LAw: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 314 (2d ed. 1952). Pignus
essentially was anything given as security for a debt, bond, good conduct, etc. Id.
at 315. It applied to any person, thing, or event that secured anything. Id. Pig-
nus acted like a surety or a guarantee in the given situation. Id.
The second lien-like concept is hypothec, which arose during the time of Jus-
tinian. Id. at 315. Hypothec has no modem equivalent in the law; it was broadly
security for a loan or a debt. Id. Originally, maritime liens were hypothec, but
the addition of notice requirements for maritime liens has since rendered them
different from hypothec. Id. at 318. Hypothec was unique because the possession
of the thing offered for security remained in the hands of the debtor. Id. at 317.
The arrangement thus made it possible for the same collateral to be saddled with
subsequent charges. Id. Roman law recognized this arrangement as binding for
rents, but later expanded hypothec to cover other obligations. Id. at 317-18 Hy-
pothec were good against all except for a prior charges. Id. at 317. Even though
hypothecs, like equitable liens, did not depend on actual possession, their range
was more like that of common law liens. Id. Yet, unlike common liens, hypothec
conveyed a possessory right. Id. Whereas, under common law liens once posses-
sion was lost the right of lien likewise dissipated, Roman law allowed the seizure
of the attached goods wherever they were. Id. at 318.
Under Roman law, there was such a thing as a true lien, which existed, in the
third form, ius retentionis. Id. at 319. This form of security carried with it no
right of sale. Id. As its name indicates, it was the right to retain goods until
payment of a debtor owed to the possessor was paid. Id. The subject matter of
both pignus and ius retentionis was a chattel, but since under either system peo-
ple could promise things other than those that they owned outright it was possi-
ble to bind an interest less than ownership or an obligation. Id.
130. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1029 (1982).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. D.Y. OVERTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF LIENS AT COMMON LAw, EQUITY, STAT-
UTORY & MARITIME 2 (1883).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id.
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law, and the early law of the United States make a unitary definition
impossible. It is too much a situational concept. In England, for ex-
ample, a lien existed as a right under the name "right of retainer" as
early as the reign of Edward IV,137 but it was not called a "lien" until
137. What are Blackstone's observations of liens? Under English law an interest in
land could be "gaged" or pledged in payment of debtor. This pledge was of two
types, either "living" or "dead" (i.e., the mortgage). 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 157-58 (Garland ed. 1978). The "living"
pledge reverted to its borrower but the mortgage had to be reconveyed upon pay-
ment. Id. at 158. The mortgagee would in either case take the land into his
possession in the character of a pledge, or the pignus of Roman law. Id. But
during the period that it remained in the mortgager's possession it was more akin
to the hypothec. Id. "In Glanvil's time when the universal method of conveyance
was by livery of seizin, or corporeal tradition of the lands, no gage or pledge of
lands was good unless possession was also given to the creditor." Id. at 159-60.
Possession was favored in order to prevent latter fraudulent pledges of the same
land. Id. at 160.
As English law evolved, different methods for securing payment of debts came
into use. These systems took the form of deeds which were not intended to trans-
fer property, but were intended to charge or burden lands and naturally to dis-
charge them again upon satisfaction of a condition. Id. at 340. These deeds were
in the nature of obligations or bonds, recognizances, and discharges of them both.
Id. An obligation or bond was a type of deed whereby the obligor obliged himself
and his estate to pay a certain sum to another at an appointed time. Id. Where
the deed promised payment alone it was called a "simple obligation," but usually
a condition would be added to the deed, with the effect that if the condition were
satisfied the debt would be canceled. Id. at 480. An obligation was a collateral
rather than direct charge on the lands in the sense that the debt, if still standing
upon the day appointed, would be taken out of the lands only if there were not
enough personal assets of the obligor to satisfy it. Id. at 340-41. Examples of
obligations include: payment of rent; performance of covenants in a deed; or re-
payment of a principal sum of money loaned to the obligor by the obligee, includ-
ing interest. Id.
Whereas obligations created fresh debts, recognizances were acknowledg-
ments of former debts upon the record. Id. at 341. The distinction between a
bond and a recognizance is that the former is a part of the original deed and the
latter arises between the same parties in a separate deed. Id. Recognizances
further divided into two types, public and private. Id. Public recognition took the
form of the debtor admitting in writing an unsettled debt to another and ac-
knowledging the encumbrance on his lands unless the debt or performance owed
were satisfied first. Id. at 341-42. Since it was affirmed only by the court record
and not under the party's seal it was not strictly a deed, but it did have greater
effect than a common duty, being allowed a priority in payment, and binding on
the lands of the cognizor (i.e. the debtor) from the time recording. Id.
There were two types of private recognizances. First, the statute staple,
which was entered into before the mayor of the staple in accordance with the
statute 23 Hen. VIII. ch. 6. Id. at 341-42. The merchant entered into a private
recognizance before the chief magistrate of a trading town commensurate with
the statute 13 Edw. I. de mercatoribus. Id. at 160. Since these forms of security
were intended to benefit commerce, they were originally allowed only between
traders. Id. In order to satisfy the debt, the debtor could be incarcerated, his
possessions could be seized, and his lands given to the creditor until the debt
could be discharged out of the rents and profits. Id. at 342. While the creditor
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approximately the beginning of the 18th Century.138 Just as the right
of retainer at common law implied possession, a lien also implied pos-
session.139 But, unlike the right of retainer, the term "lien" came to
embrace other rights that did not depend upon possession, as in statu-
tory, equitable, or maritime liens. 140
Under English common law, a lien was defined as an obligation
tied to, or claim annexed or attached upon property, without satisfy-
ing which, the owner could not demand the property subjected to the
lien.141 It was not considered a property interest in the thing itself or
a cause of action for the thing itself, thus it was a legal charge against
the property, but a mere a right to retain the property until the debt
was satisfied. 14 2 Though this version of a lien gave the seller the right
to retain the article, it was wholly dependent upon the lienholder's
possession and once delivered to a third party it could not be recovered
again.143 Actual or constructive possession was required for the lien
to exist, so the surrender of possession was fatal to it.14 4 In contrast,
the Roman law lien was similar to a common law vendor's lien in that
the failure to pay gave the seller the right to retain possession as a
promise for payment, but the Roman lien additionally gave the seller
the right to seize the goods in the hands of the buyer, or even the
subsequent buyers, upon default.145
held the lands he was a tenant in statute staple or merchant. The statute of 23
Hen VIII. Ch 6 expanded a version of statute staple to all of the king's subjects.
Id. at 342. This statutory extension further allowed the acknowledgment of re-
cognizances before either of the chief justices, or before their substitutes if the
justices were out of term. Id. at 342.
The use of devices of statute staple and statute merchant dwindled in En-
gland and were replaced by the remedy of the writ of elegit, which was created by
the statute of Westm. 2. Id. at 161. Estate by elegit existed when the creditor
would get a judgment for his debt at law, and then the sheriff would give the
creditor possession of the debtor's lands and tenements, which creditor could then
occupy until his debt was fully paid. Id. Blackstone points out that these inter-
ests are only chattel interests and not freeholds because they go to the executor of
the estate and not to the heirs. Id.
Statutory liens, judicial liens, and security interests all come within the scope
of the Bankruptcy definition of lien. S. REP. No. 95-989 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5811. Except for certain common law liens, these three cate-
gories of lien are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Id.
138. 1 LEONARD A JoNEs, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF LIENS 3 n.2 (3d ed. 1914).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. It could also take the form of a suit in rem to enforce payment. Id.
143. Id. at 17-20.
144. Id. at 3, 17-20.
145. Id. at 3-4.
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The common law of the United States tracked somewhere between
the English common law lien and the vendor's lien of Roman law. 146
The United States common law version of a lien was generally a
charge or encumbrance upon property that secured payment of the
debt or performance of the duty. While it was separate from the obli-
gation that it secured, in the absence of a debt or obligation there
could be no lien.147 Whereas the English common law lien implied a
right to retain possession of the property until the debt was satisfied,
United States lien law has permitted more extensive meaning, in that
it came to designate all of the different contractually created charges
146. Liens predicated upon judgments arose from the right, granted by early statutes,
to take out an elegit or to subject the property to seizure and sale upon execution.
Brown v. Vonnhame, 343 N.W. 2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1984) ("Consequently, such
liens are creatures of statutory provisions, owe their life and force entirely to legis-
lation, and do not exist except by its authority.").
What is the United States case law view of a lien? Absent legislative intent to
define lien in another way, a lien may generally be defined as a claim, encum-
brance, or charge on property for payment of some debt, obligation or duty. West-
wood Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Lane County, 864 P.2d 350, 355-56 (Or. 1993)
(holding that the Association's power to make assessments is not a lien). A lien is
basically a security right that is given to persons which allows them to sell or
seize the collateral that is the subject of the lien. See id. at 355.
Liens are distinct from the debt they secure and therefore there is a remedy in
the nature of security. See Kalio Universal, Inc. v. B.A.M. Inc., 231 A.2d 376, 379
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). "A lien is a property right." In re Penrod, 50
F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995). The Code looks to state law to determine the extent
of the property interest represented by lien. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S.
393, 398 (1992). Though the method of enforcing common law liens is statutorily
supplied, the common law rules for creating such liens still prevail. See Kalio,
231 A.2d at 379. According to Kalio,
to establish a common law lien an artisan must prove that [1] the chattel
was bailed to him, [21 that he expended his skill and labor in the im-
provement of the chattel, [3] that he conferred upon it an additional
value, [4] that he had the expressed or implied consent of the owner to do
the work, and [51 that he was employed for the purpose of doing the
work.
Id. (citing White v. Smith, 44 N.J.L. 105, 109-10, 112 (N.J. Super. 1882)).
"A lien can only be created with the owner's consent, that is, by a contract
express or implied with the owner of the property or with someone by him duly
authorized, or without his consent by the operation of some positive rule of law,
as by statute." Harriss v. Parks, 187 P. 470, 471 (Okla. 1920). On the other
hand, a common law possessory lien cannot exist without consent between the
owner of the property and the person performing services on the property. Cap-
son v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona, 677 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Ariz. 1984)
(finding that a towing company had neither a statutory nor a common law lien for
the cost of towing and storage of an automobile parked on private property with-
out permission). The bankruptcy definition of the term "lien" is broad enough to
encompass both a vendor's lien and a vendor's privilege under Louisiana law as
well as judicial liens, security interests, and statutory liens. In re Hughes, 9 B.R.
251, 257 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981) (holding that the Louisiana vendor's privilege is
avoidable by the trustee in bankruptcy as a bona fide purchaser).
147. See United States v. Phillips, 267 F.2d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1959).
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on land or personalty. 148 Modern bankruptcy law continues to follow
this understanding of the lien and defines it as a "charge against or
interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an
obligation."149
B. Common Law Within the Code's Priority Structure for
Fixtures
In summary, the current Code provisions take this concept of a lien
and its rich and diverse history and try to place it within the Code
framework of consensual security interests. This is accomplished in
two separate priority provisions that were first seen in the 1962 Code.
First, a secured party who was perfected before the lien attached had
the victory in the original version. Second, if the goods were classified
as fixtures, the priority rule remained the same so long as the security
interest was filed as a fixture filing. What is necessary, is a way of
describing the lien found in the common law of the United States and
in Article Nine that also connects with the understanding of Bank-
ruptcy Code section 545.
Article Nine offers some important clues. First, there is U.C.C.
section 9-317's treatment of the lien creditor. Second, there is the gen-
eral priority treatment for possessory liens. The combination is in-
structive. In general, a lien is given priority dating from its
"becoming" a lien and if this attachment or creation occurs before
perfection then the secured party loses.150 If the lien is possessory it
dates from, and depends on possession,151 and is given a presumptive
priority over even an earlier filed security interest.152 This is a telling
combination because it assigns priority to make "effective" the posses-
sory lien, yet leaves the general lien creditor dependent upon date of
taking the lien similar to the general first in time, first in right rule of
Article Nine.153
C. Here of Choate and In Choate and How the Drafters
Resolved the Issue
In summary, the current Code provisions take this concept of lien
and its rich and diverse history and try to peg it within the Code
framework. This is accomplished in two separate priority provisions
that were first seen in the 1962 Code. A secured party, who was per-
fected before the lien attached, had the victory in the original ver-
148. See, e.g., Mobile Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robertson, 65 Ala. 382, 390 (1880).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2000).
150. U.C.C. § 9-317(a) (2000).
151. Id. § 9-333(a)(3) (2000).
152. See id. § 9-333(b).
153. See id. § 9-322(a) (2000).
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sion. 1 54 Second, if the goods were classified as fixtures, the priority
rule remained the same so long as the security interest was filed as a
fixture filing.
In large part, this special treatment of fixtures with dual filings
owes its complexity to the rich history of fixtures.155 The 1962 draft
responded to this well developed, but chaotic system by sidestepping
the issue of definition in favor of a general principle of allowing re-
moval of the fixture by the secured party, but otherwise not attempt-
ing to fit the personalty interest within the real estate and lien
system.15 6 By simply calling the new interest a security interest and
giving the secured party priority where the perfection occurred
first, 15 7 the Code allowed the secured party to defeat any encum-
brancer or owner no matter the classification of the goods as fixtures
or non-fixtures. 158 In other words, Article Nine as originally offered to
the states allowed the fixture law as real estate to continue and run
parallel. Whichever interest was first, real estate interest in fixtures
or personalty interest by the secured party, gained priority over the
other. 15 9 The first to perfect by real estate recording or Article Nine
filing ruled the day. 160
Gilmore observed that the controversy generated by the i962
Code's provisions on fixtures was as unexpected as it was intense.161
Predictably, the real estate bar was the most agitated because, even
though its meaning was apparent, 162 the real estate lobbyists waited
until promulgation and attacked the provision before the state legisla-
tures as unworkable and "wrong as a matter of policy." 16 3 This seems
to have surprised and befuddled the Drafters who saw the controversy
as largely having been worked out during former law. 164 The Drafters
intended to cleave to the existing majority rule and made the conces-
sion that in the world of parallel filings it would take a real estate
records filing to defeat the real estate encumbrancer.165 A real estate
154. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1962).
155. Gilmore devoted a full chapter, thirty-three pages, in his treatise to the pre-code
and non-code history and development of fixture law in the United States. See
generally GILMORE, supra note 1, § 28, at 743-76.
156. See U.C.C. § 9-313(5) (1962).
157. See id. § 9-313(4).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. Subsection (1) of section 9-313 made it clear that real estate filings were
possible, subsection (2) gave the priority to the secured party except as in subsec-
tion (4), as subsection (4) gave it to the real estate encumbrancer if recorded
before the interest was perfected.
161. See GILMORE, supra note 1, § 30.1, at 801-02.
162. See id.
163. Id. § 30.2, at 802-03.
164. Id. § 30.2, at 803-06.
165. See id.; U.C.C. § 9-402 (1962).
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lawyer need not become proficient in Article Nine because a validly
perfected security interest in fixtures would only occur with a real es-
tate filing.166 Yet, the 1962 text was controversial on the issue of pri-
166. See id. § 9-402. By the time of the 1972 amendments the section had a different
look. The following is a lined version of the changes made for the 1972 amend-
ments. Additions to the previous text in all U.C.C. sections provided herein are
underlined. Deletions in all U.C.C. sections provided herein are in brackets.
§ 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement; Amendments;
Mortgae as Financing Statement
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it ives the names of the
debtor and the secured narty, is signed by the debtor [and the secured
party], gives an address of the secured party from which information
concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing ad-
dress of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or
describing the items, of collateral. A financing statement may be filed
before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise at-
taches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be
grown [or goods which are or are to become fixtures], the statement must
also contain a description of the real estate concerned. When the financ-
ing statement covers timber to be cut or covers minerals or the like (in-
cluding oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103.
or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-
313) and the collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, the
statement must also comply with subsection (5). A copy of the security
agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the above
information and is signed by [both parties.] the debtor. A carbon, photo-
graphic or other reproduction of a security agreement or a financing
statement is sufficient as a financina statement if the security agree-
ment so provides or if the original has been filed in this state.
(2) A financing statement which otherwise complies with subsection
(1) is sufficient [although] when it is signed [only] by the secured party
instead of the debtor if it is filed to perfect a security interest in
(a) collateral already subject to a security interest in another ju-
risdiction when it is brought into this state, or when the
debtor's location is changed to this state. Such a financing
statement must state that the collateral was brought into this
state or that the debtor's location was changed to this state
under such circumstances; or
(b) proceeds under Section 9-306 if the security interest in the
original collateral was perfected. Such a financing statement
must describe the original collateral; or
(c) collateral as to which the filing has lapsed: or
(d) collateral acquired after a change of name. identity or corpo-
rate structure of the debtor (subsection (7)),
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with sub-
section (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor) ..........
Address ..........
Name of secured party (or assignee) ..........
Address
1. This financing statement covers the following types (or items)
of property:
(Describe) ..........
2. (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are growing or
are to be grown on:
(Describe Real Estate) ..........
636 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:607
ority, specifically because it gave what seemed to be a counterintuitive
[3.] [(If collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures)
The above described goods are affixed or to be affixed to:
(Describe Real Estate) ..........
3. (If anplicable) The above goods are to become fixtures on*
*Where appropriate substitute either "The above timber is
standing on. .. ." or "The above minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts will be financed at the wellhead or
minehead of the well or mine located on . .. ."
(Describe Real Estate) .......... and this financing statement is
to be filed [ [for record] ] in the real estate records. (If the
debtor does not have an interest of record) The name of a re-
cord owner is ..........
4. (If [proceeds or] products of collateral are claimed) [Proceeds-]
Products of the collateral are also covered.
u se ................................................................................
whichever Signature of Debtor (or Assignor)
applicable Signature of Secured Party (or Assignee)
(4) A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing signed
by both the debtor and the secured party. An amendment does not ex-
tend the period of effectiveness of a financing statement. [The term "fi-
nancing statement" as used in this Article means the original financing
statement and any amendments but ifl If any amendment adds collat-
eral, it is effective as to the added collateral only from the filing date of
the amendment. In this Article, unless the context otherwise reQuires.
the term "financing statement" means the original financing statement
and any amendments.
(5) A financing statement covering timber to be cut or covering min-
erals or the like (includina oil and gas) or accounts subiect to subsection
(5) of Section 9-103. or a financing statement filed as a fixture filing (Sec-
tion 9-313) where the debtor is not a transmitting utility, must show
that it covers this type of collateral. must recite that it is to be filed [[for
recordfl in the real estate records, and the financing statement must
contain a description of the real estate [[sufficient if it were contained in
a mortgae of the real estate to give constructive notice of the mortgage
under the law of this statel. If the debtor does not have an interest of
record in the real estate. the financing statement must show the name of
a record owner,
(6) A mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture
filing from the date of its recordina if (a) the goods are described in the
mortgage by item or type. (b) the goods are or are to become fixtures
related to the real estate described in the mortgage. (c) the mortgage
comnlies with the requirements for a financing statement in this section
other than a recital that it is to be filed in the real estate records- and (d)
the mortgage is duly recorded. No fee with reference to the financing
statement is required other than the regular recording and satisfaction
fees with respect to the mortgage.
(7) A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor it
it ives the individual. partnership or corporate name of the debtor.
whether or not it adds other trade names or the names of partners.
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization
itAs name, identity or cornorate structure that a filed financing statement
becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a se-
curity interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement
is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed financing statement
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remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor
even though the secured partv knows of or consents to the transfer,
(8) [(5)] A financing statement substantially complying with. the re-
quirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor er-
rors which are not seriously misleading.
Note: Lanauage in double brackets is optional,
Note: Where the state has any special recording system for real estate
other than the usual grantor-Frantee index (as. for instance, a tract sYs-
tem or a title registration or Torrens system) local adaptations of subsec-
tion (5) and Section 9-403(7) maybe necessary. See Mass. Gen. Laws
Chapter 106. Section 9-409.
Reasons for the 1972 Change
Certain changes are conforming changes to new requirements of Sec-
tion 9-401 that certain financing statements covering such collateral as
timber and minerals be filed in the real estate records. Persons inter-
ested in real estate have complained with some justice that the provi-
sions of the 1962 Code failed in several ways to tie the fixture filings to
the real estate search system. Among these was the absence of clear
specification that the fixture security interest was to be indexed in the
real estate records. On this point, a responsive change has been made in
Section 9-403. Other objections related to the adequacy of the real estate
description and to the fact that the debtor might not be an owner of an
interest of record in the real estate. The optional language in subsection
(5) is designed to meet the objection as to real estate descriptions but
without imposing on a fixture-secured party the duty of obtaining a "le-
gal description" unless the state's recording system requires it. While no
doubt a full "legal description" is proper practice in conveyancing, it is
believed that something significantly less, like a street address, would be
adequate in most states, and would frequently be a guide to a recorded
map. Where a state has a tract index system or other special system not
dependent on a grantor-grantee index, special adaptations may be re-
quired and no attempt is made in the Code to deal with all such
situations.
Another objection of real estate parties has been that the name of the
debtor might not be in the real estate chain of title and there have been
numerous non-uniform amendments to Sections 9-401, 9-402, or 9-403
designed to require the showing of the name of the record owners of the
real estate in the financing statement. Since Section 9-313(4) (a) and (b)
permit fixture filing against persons in possession of the real estate who
do not have interests of record, Section 9-402 requires the naming of an
owner of record of the real estate in such cases, and Section 9-403(7)
requires indexing the fixture filing against the name.
Subsection (6) makes it possible for a real estate mortgage to serve as
a financing statement, and a related change in Section 9-403(6) makes it
unnecessary to file continuation statements for such a financing
statement.
Subsection (1) has been changed to require only the signature of the
debtor rather than that of the secured party. The requirement of signa-
tures of secured parties has sometimes misled secured parties, who are
accustomed to pre-Code practice and real estate practice under which
only the debtor, not the secured party, need sign such instruments as
chattel mortgages and real estate mortgages. Thus, when the security
agreement was used as the financing statement, it might have been de-
fective under the 1962 Code for failure to have the signature of the se-
cured party. This change also fits in with the provisions of Section 9-
403(6), under which a real estate mortgage (customarily signed only by
the debtor) may be effective as a financing statement.
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answer. It appeared to allow an Article Nine fixture filing to defeat an
earlier filed real estate encumbrance.16 7
In actual operation, the Drafters' logic is readily apparent and is
not counterintuitive. Assume that State Bank (hereinafter "SB") fi-
nances the purchase of an existing shopping mall and takes a mort-
gage on the mall property. Then assume the debtor goes to a
Computer Dealer (hereinafter "CD") to obtain a computer operated cli-
mate control system. CD installs the system and files a fixture filing
in the records where SB's record clearly and already exists. It seems
obvious that although first in time, SB is not a reliance creditor, at
least not to the same extent as CD. In fact, it does no harm to the
expectation of SB to give CD the victory as to the computerized equip-
ment even though fixtures under state law are covered by the mort-
gage so long as any injury done to remove the fixtures by CD is repaid
to SB. Section 9-313(1) in the initial draft later became section 9-
313(4) in the 1962 version of the Code. It provided for this result by
allowing the later fixture filing to win so long as there was no "subse-
quent advance." It appears that this is a reliance based priority and,
as importantly, a decision not to favor the earlier filed interest be-
cause of this party's lack of "reliance."16 s And given reliance by one
party, but not by the real estate lender, the result was identical in
logic to the result in the purchase money security interest situation.
The later filing purchase money secured party is given priority over
any earlier filed security interests. 169
While the 1962 version of the Code labored through the evaluation,
criticism, and adoption process, Gilmore came to accept a resolution of
the conflict proffered by Professor Kripke, one of the consultants and
later Drafters of revised Article Nine. Kripke, who would succeed Gil-
more as the Chief Reporter by the time of the 1972 amendments, had
suggested that perfection should not mean priority. This would allow
the existing real estate lender to defeat the later security interest, 170
even though properly perfected. The 1972 revision reflected this
Changes in the form of financing statement in subsection (3) conform
to the foregoing and are also intended to have the secured party make
clear when a financing statement is intended to be filed in real estate
records. This had been a matter of some concern when the parties used
the term "fixture" loosely in their description of goods.
Some of the changes in section 9-402 are not related to real estate
filings. The changes in paragraph (2)(a) conform to section 9-103(3),
which requires refiling when the debtor's location changes. Additions in
subsections (2)(d) and (7) relating to the problem of the name of the
debtor against which a filing should be made and the effect of transfer
are discussed in the related Comments.
167. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 802 n.2.
168. Id.
169. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(4) (1962). This was part of the Drafters' rationale. See U.C.C.
§ 9-313 cmt. 4 (1978).
170. See Gilmore, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 820-21.
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change in two significant ways. First, the real estate filing method
was made more clear.171 Second, the prior real estate lender was
171. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-402, 313(4)(a) (1972). The text of 9-402 in the 1972
version was:
Section 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement; Amendments;
Mortgage as Financing Statement.
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the
debtor and secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the
secured party from which information concerning the security interest
may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. A
financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or
a security interest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement
covers crops growing or to be grown, the statement must also contain a
description of the real estate concerned. When the financing statement
covers timber to be cut or covers minerals or the like (including oil and
gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the
collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement
must also comply with subsection (5). A copy of the security agreement
is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the above information
and is signed by the debtor. A carbon, photographic or other reproduc-
tion of a security agreement or a financing statement is sufficient as a
financing statement if the security agreement so provides or if the origi-
nal has been filed in this state.
(2) A financing statement which otherwise complies with subsection
(1) is sufficient when it is signed by the secured party instead of the
debtor if it is filed to perfect a security interest in
(a) collateral already subject to a security interest in another ju-
risdiction when it is brought into this state, or when the
debtor's location is changed to this state. Such a financing
statement must state that the collateral was brought into this
state or that the debtor's location was changed to this state
under such circumstances; or
(b) proceeds under Section 9-306 if the security interest in the
original collateral was perfected. Such a financing statement
must describe the original collateral; or
(c) collateral as to which the filing has lapsed; or
(d) collateral acquired after a change of name, identity or corpo-
rate structure of the debtor (subsection (7)).
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with sub-
section (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor)
Address
Name of secured party (or assignee)
Address
1. This financing statement covers the following types (or
items) of property:
(Describe)
2. (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are grow-
ing or are to be grown on:
(Describe Real Estate)
3. (If applicable) The above goods are to become fixtures on*
(Describe Real Estate)and this financing statement is to be
filed [for record] in the real estate records. (If the debtor
does not have an interest of record) The name of the record
owner is
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:607
given substantial protection where he or she was a "construction
lender" and therefore likely to be relying on the integration of fixtures
as part of construction project.172
In foreshadowing the 1972 changes Gilmore, in his 1965 treatise,
offered this telling statement:
The author has been persuaded by Mr. Kripke's analysis. His separation of
the problem of perfection from the problem of priorities is consistent with the
basic structure of Article Nine. The article recognizes a great variety of situa-
4. (If products of collateral are claimed) Products of the collat-
eral are also covered.
(use whichever is applicable) Signature of Debtor (or As-
signor) or Signature of Secured Party (or Assignee)
(4) A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing singed
by both the debtor and the secured party. An amendment does not ex-
tend the period of effectiveness of a financing statement. In this Article,
unless the context otherwise requires, the term "financing statement"
means the original financing statement and any amendments.
(5) A financing statement covering timber to be cut or covering min-
erals or the like (including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection
(5) of Section 9-103, or a financing statement filed as a fixture filing (Sec-
tion 9-313) where the debtor is not a transmitting utility, must show
that it covers this type of collateral, must recite that it is to be filed (for
record] in the real estate records, and the financing statement must con-
tain a description of the real estate [sufficient if it were contained in a
mortgage of the real estate to give constructive notice of the mortgage
under the law of this state]. If the debtor does no have an interest of
record in the real estate, the financing statement must show the name of
a record owner.
(6) A mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture
filing from the date of its recording if
(a) the goods are described in the mortgage by item or type; and
(b) the goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real es-
tate described in the mortgage; and
(c) the mortgage complies with the requirements for a financing
statement in this section other than a recital that it is to be
filed in the real estate records; and
(d) the mortgage is duly recorded.
No fee with reference to the financing statement is required other
than the regular recording and satisfaction fees with respect to
the mortgage.
(7) A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if
it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor,
whether or not it adds other trade names or names of partners. Where
the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its
name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing statement
becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a se-
curity interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement
is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed financing statement
remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor
even though the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer.
(8) A financing statement is substantially complying with the re-
quirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor er-
rors which are not seriously misleading.
172. See U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972).
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tions in which a security interest, although perfected (and therefore good
against lien creditors and trustees in bankruptcy), may nevertheless be subor-
dinated to other interests. Mr. Kripke's proposal is, essentially, to add the
chattel interest in fixtures to the list of such situations. He would then im-
pose, as a condition of priority (but not as a condition of perfection), the addi-
tional requirement of real estate filing (or "notification") much has § 9-312(3)
imposes conditions of priority for the purchase money security interest in in-
ventory which have nothing whatever to do with the perfection of the inven-
tory security interests. To Mr. Kripke's suggestion of a real estate
notification-by-filing, the author would add, for reasons which are developed
in the following discussion, a requirement of actual notification to certain
prior or distant real estate interests - but this would be an additional condi-
tion of priority in certain situations, not one of perfection.17 3
The heart of Gilmore's argument, or his self-persuasion, lies in the
statement: "The article recognizes a great variety of situations in
which a security interest, although perfected ... may nevertheless be
subordinated to other interests."17 4 Gilmore accurately portrayed the
original and sound policy of Article Nine in the 1962 version. Secured
transactions ought to require attachment and perfection, and perfec-
tion often means something in terms of priority. Gone were concerns
for the intricacies of choate and in choate. Also, largely gone was the
distinction made between possessory and non-possessory interests.
One need look no further than the complementary basic provisions
and section 9-301, which deals with an "unperfected" security interest
and section 9-312(5), which is the basic priority world in the former
Article Nine. It is possible to call these two provisions the "stick" and
the "carrot" articulation of secured transactions policy. An un-
perfected secured party lost to the bankruptcy trustee and this was
stated as the rule of section 9-301.175 On the other hand, a perfected
secured party, by negative implication, beat the trustee.176 Thus, the
secured party gained the protection, the reward of perfection, 17 7 al-
though he or she might still lose to others who were also perfected
earlier.178
The carrot offered by section 9-312 was that once perfected, the
perfected security interest gained first in time, first in right priority
over all other perfected security interests and by clear implication de-
feated unperfected security interests and lien creditors. Thus, there
was a reward to complement the punishment of section 9-301. In this
way, secured parties were not only encouraged to perfect, but to per-
fect early. 179 Perfection gained a reward, but not a guarantee of prior-
173. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 820-21.
174. Id. § 30.5, at 821.
175. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972).
179. The rule of first to file or perfect encourages early filing even though, technically,
perfection comes later. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 312(5) (1962).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ity. This is so basic that examples need not be given.1 80 Perhaps it is
obvious, so obvious as to be a truism, but it bears emphasis here.
Perfection does not mean absolute priority. In this sense, Professor
Kripke's proposal that Gilmore bought into was a continuation, but it
was also much more. First, Kripke's proposal represents a significant
policy resolution of a priority conflict that could have gone either way.
The half-loaf given to personal property financiers by the Kripke reso-
lution was a victory over the lien creditor, but not the real estate en-
cumbrancer. Gilmore saw this half-loaf as an acceptable trade to
quiet the real estate rebellion. This eventually became the Code posi-
tion with the 1972 revision.181 The changes this revision accom-
180. Just to show it can be done, consider section 9-312(3)-(4) (purchase money secur-
ity interest parties defeat otherwise earlier perfected secured parties), section 9-
307(1)-(2) (buyers defeat perfected secured parties), and sections 9-308 and 9-309
(transferees and certain purchasers of negotiable instruments and chattel paper
defeat perfected secured parties). All are from the 1972 version of the Code.
181. Is there any coincidence that Professor Kripke, then attorney Kripke was the
Chief Reporter for the 1972 Revision? The full text of the new priority rules con-
tained in the 1972 version is as follows:
§ 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the con-
flicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest,
the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the
goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by a
fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten
days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in
the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the
interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the secur-
ity interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a pred-
ecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner; and the debtor
has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession
of the real estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines
or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances
which are consumer goods, and before the goods become fix-
tures, the security interest is perfected by any method permit-
ted by this Article; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by
legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was
perfected by any method permitted by this Article.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has pri-
ority over the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the
real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the
security interest or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as
fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the en-
cumbrancer or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the pri-
ority of the security interest continues for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise
subject to subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is
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plished were two-fold: (1) they made clear that only a real estate filing
would defeat real estate financierslS 2 and (2) they reversed the victory
of Article Nine financiers over real estate encumbrancers where the
Article Nine filing came later and put in its place the purchase money
security interest analogy with construction mortgage real estate fin-
anciers trumping even these.1 8 3 The Drafters provided only a vague
subordinate to a construction mortgage recorded before the goods be-
come fixtures if the goods become fixtures before the completion of the
construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a construction
mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the con-
struction mortgage.
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest
in fixtures is subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer
or owner of the related real estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encum-
brancers of real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of
Part (5), remove his collateral from the real estate but he must reim-
burse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor
and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical
injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by
the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them.
A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove
until the secured part gives adequate security for the performance of this
obligation.
Reasons for 1972 Change
As the Code came to be widely enacted, the real estate bar came to
realize the impact of the fixture provisions on real estate financing and
real estate titles. They apparently had not fully appreciated the impact
of these provisions of Article 9 on real estate matters during the enact-
ment of the Code, because of the commonly-held assumption that Article
9 was concerned only with chattel security matters.
The treatment of fixtures in pre-Code law had varied widely from
state to state. The treatment in Article 9 was based generally on prior
treatment in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which, however, had
been enacted in only a dozen states. In other states the word "fixture"
had come to mean that a former chattel had become real estate for all
purposes and that any chattel rights therein were lost. For lawyers
trained in such states the Code provisions seemed to be extreme. Some
sections of the real estate bar began attempting with some success to
have Section 9-313 amended to bring it closer to the pre-Code law in
their states. In some states, such as California and Iowa, Section 9-313
simply was not enacted.
Even supporters of Article 9 and of its fixture provisions came to rec-
ognize that there were some ambiguities in Section 9-313, particularly in
its application to construction mortgages, and also in its failure to make
it clear that filing of fixture security interests was to be in real estate
records where they could be found by a standard real estate search.
Section 9-313 and related provisions of Part 4 have been redrafted to
meet the legitimate criticisms and to make a substantial shift in the law
in favor of construction mortgages. The specific changes are described in
the 1972 Comments to Section 9-313, and the Comments to the several
sections of Part 4.
182. U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1972).
183. Id. § 9-313(6).
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definition of fixture, which urged courts to look to real estate law for
the character of assets.1 8 4
Most telling is the subtle alteration in these 1972 revisions that
was worked by the revised section 9-401.185 It quietly provided an
option to the Article Nine secured party. A secured party, not inter-
ested in engaging the real estate interests in a priority battle, was
given the option of priority outside of real estate and solely within the
personal property scheme of Article Nine. By making a filing not
"filed as a fixture filing," this secured creditor was sent to the non-real
estate records.18 6 It seems this was a good bit broader than necessary
to accomplish Gilmore's purposes. First, Gilmore seemed to offer the
priority and perfection solution as replacement for a definition of fix-
184. Id. § 9-313(1) cmt. 1.
185. The text of U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972) is as follows:
§ 9-401 Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Collateral
First Alternative to Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows:
(a) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is mineral or the like
(including oil and gas) or accounts subject to a subsection (5) of
Section 9-103, or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture
filing (Section 9-313) and the noncollateral is goods which are or
are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the
real estate would be filed or recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
Second Alternative Subsection (1)
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like
(including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of
Section 9-103, or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture
filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral is goods which are or are
to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the
real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
Third Alternative Subsection (1)
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like
(including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of
Section 9-103, or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture
filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral is goods which are or are
to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the
real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State] and in
addition, if the debtor has a place of business in only one county
of this state, also in the office of ..... of such county, or if the
debtor has no place of business in this state, but resides in the
state, also in the office of ...... of the county in which he resides.
Note: One of the three alternatives should be selected as subsection (1).
Note: Subsection (6) should be used only if the state chooses the Second
or Third Alternative Subsection (1). emphasis added.
186. U.C.C. §§ 9-401(1)(a), -402 (1) (1972).
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tures.18 7 The definition, such as it was, was one, intended or not, that
made real estate law preeminent.'8 8 Then, there is the priority re-
form itself. The 1972 changes brought fixtures in line with the gen-
eral priority world. First in time, first in right with a purchase money
security interest exception that can trump that purchase money secur-
ity interest' 8 9 with a construction mortgage. So, why the acceptance
of a dual perfection method except as solace to the Article Nine per-
sonal property financiers? Further, among these personal property
financiers priority continued to be based on the first in time, first in
right rule. The significant gain is that by including dual methods of
perfection, all Article Nine secured parties would be perfected, and
therefore defeat the trustee in bankruptcy. 190
This is a fairly blatant statement of purpose, the purpose being to
defeat the trustee and other "lien creditors" in the real estate. 19 1
While great deference is given to real estate encumbrancers, no defer-
ence is given to real estate lien holders. "Reliance" for protecting en-
cumbrancers reenters the picture as the reason offered for their
protection and the commensurate lack of protection for lienors. 192
The lack of protection of these lien creditors stands out.19 3 Again, this
seems to overshoot the target of redressing the real estate bar's con-
cerns by such a distance as to suggest a different motivation. The one
offered was probably the most ingenuous statement that one can hope
for. It amounts to granting perfection, and in this case, priority,
against the trustee. Since the trustee is the quintessential lien credi-
tor, granting perfection means an automatic win, but it is a win not
needed to assuage the real estate bar.
It is a victory only in bankruptcy and thus is a "lien" which takes
effect only in bankruptcy. It is meaningless outside of bankruptcy be-
cause a genuine real estate interest or reliance real estate financier
will have priority. What respectable lawyer, when asked for an opin-
ion about the strength of security, would answer that it is secure be-
cause it beats only non-reliance creditors? This is an important
question in a body of law that exists to provide for "secure transac-
tions." Security must be equated with priority and priority is mea-
187. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 30.5, at 820. This was codified in U.C.C. § 9-313(4)
(1972).
188. See U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a)(1972). see also id. § 9-313 cmt. (discussing the meaning
of "fixture").
189. U.C.C. § 9-313(3)-(4) (1972). There is the added gloss of a super purchase money
security interest in the guise of the construction mortgage that can trump even
the fixture purchase money security interest if the fixtures are added during con-
struction. Id. § 9-313(6) (1972).
190. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) (1978); see also § 9-313 (Reasons for Changes) (1978)
(discussing criticisms leading to the amendment of § 9-313(4)).
191. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) (1978).
192. Id. § 9-313 cmt. 4(c) (1978).
193. See id.
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sured pretty much the same as any other victory. One either wins,
finishes in second place, or worse. Even second place is not a place to
be when a financier seeks a secured transaction. It is a rare financier-
client who will see a second-place finish as an effective security inter-
est.19 4 So, as a lien, it is functionally a lien only in bankruptcy and is
a poor substitute for the desired security interest. Since it has such
limited effect, it is far from the historical understanding of a "lien." In
the United States, this interest only becomes consistent with its his-
torical role when it becomes effective to defeat the trustee in bank-
ruptcy.19 5 Although the Bankruptcy Code cases have not squarely
met this issue, this Article offers the following as a test of when state
law goes too far and becomes suspect under Bankruptcy Code section
545: If the lien is one that would not be negotiated and paid for by the
secured party as a good faith interest in the personal property, be-
cause it is ineffective against those seen as direct competitors to the
secured party, then it is a lien truly "effective" only in bankruptcy and
should be invalidated under federal principles.
D. The Common Law Holder in Due Course and Consensual
Security Interests
Negotiable instruments are defined in U.C.C. section 3-104 as:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument"
means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money,
with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if
it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes in
to the possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of
money, but the promise for order may contain (i) undertaking or power to
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authoriza-
tion or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of
collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advan-
tage or protection of an obligor. 1 9
6
While Article Nine does not provide a definition of negotiable in-
struments, it makes reference to the section 3-104 definition as a defi-
nition provided by another Article of the Code.19 7 Most simply, the
definition takes in the common forms of negotiable instruments seen
in everyday practice as checks and promissory notes.198 Going back
even further, perhaps a generation or two, the Commercial Paper
194. Id. § 9-313(4)(a)(b) (1972).
195. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
196. U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002).
197. U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (2000).
198. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002).
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course was known as Bills & Notes.199 What all negotiable instru-
ments have in common is negotiability, that is, the unique quality of
making it possible for a holder of an instrument to become a holder in
due course. 20 0 A "holder" is a person in possession of bearer paper or
order paper made to his order. 20 1 As a holder of that paper, one who
has given value, in good faith, and without notice of unauthorized sig-
natures or any claims or defenses to the paper or that it is overdue or
has been dishonored, can be elevated to holder in due course status.20 2
Thus named, the holder in due course is given preemptive ownership
rights and defeats all others with the exception of limited "real de-
fenses."20 3 All claims and defenses, even claims based on equitable
and legal title, as well as all liens and like interests, are subordinated
to the holder in due course. 20 4 This powerful status truly makes this
holder in due course a favored of the law, so favored that it is even
higher than the vaunted buyer in the ordinary course found in sales
law. So favored that Gilmore coined an oxymoron to describe the sta-
tus. He described the holder in due course in terms of having an "in-
tangible" that was not only "pledgeable," but must be pledged.
Although it sounds like an oxymoron, a "pledgeable intangible" was a
recognition of the common law world's demand that possession be pre-
eminent by requiring pledge of the negotiable instrument. 20 5
The two provisions of Article Nine, sections 9-309 and 9-304(1),206
also made possession everything. In doing so, they reinforced within
199. For instance, the American Law Reports Digest Index still refers to the subject as
Bills and Notes. ALR INDEX, ALR 2D, 3D, 4TH, 5TH, FED at 269 (1999); Negotiable
Instruments, 7 A.L.R. DIGEST TO 3D, 4TH, 5TH, FED 262 (1995) (The Digest entry
for "Negotiable Instruments" refers the user to "Bills and Notes.").
200. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002).
201. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2000).
202. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002).
203. Id. §§ 3-305, 306; Id. § 3-305 cmt. 1 (2002).
204. Id. § 3-305 (a)-(b) (2002); see also id. § 3-306 (2002) (noting that a holder in due
course takes an instrument free of claim).
205. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 12.7, at 387-88.
206. The text of U.C.C. § 9-304 (1978) is as follows:
§ 9-304. Perfection of Security Interest in Instruments, Documents, and
Goods Covered by Documents; Perfection by Permissive Filling; Tempo-
rary Perfection Without Filing or Transfer of Possession
(1) A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable documents may
be perfected by filing. A security interest in money or instruments (other
than certificated securities or instruments which constitute part of chat-
tel paper) can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession,
except as provided in subsections (4) and (5) of this section and subsec-
tions (2) and (3) of Section 9-306 on proceeds.
Official Comment




the Article Nine scheme the holder in due course rules of Article
Three. The result in section 9-309207 was a priority scheme that sub-
ordinated even the perfected secured party perfection to the holder in
due course. 20 8
Under section 9-304(1), filing is ineffective to perfect a security in-
terest in instruments (including securities) except those instruments
that are part of chattel paper, and of course, is ineffective to constitute
notice to subsequent purchasers. Although filing is permissible as a
method of perfection for a security interest in documents, this section
follows the policy of the UTRA in providing that the filing does not
constitute notice to purchasers. Logically the two rules are closely
tied, so closely tied as to be mutually exclusive. Here, we see true
Code logic as announced in the earlier drafts of Article Nine. Every
1. For most types of property, filing and taking possession are alter-
native methods of perfection. For some types of intangibles (i.e., accounts
and general intangibles) filing is the only available method (see Section
9-305 and point 1 of Comment thereto). With respect to instruments
subsection (1) provides that, except for the cases of "temporary perfec-
tion" covered in subsections (4) and (5), taking possession is the only
available method; this provision follows the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
The rule is based on the thought that where the collateral consists of
instruments, it is universal practice for the secured party to take posses-
sion of them in pledge; any surrender of possession to the debtor is for a
short time; therefore it would be unwise to provide the alternative of
perfection for a long period by filing which, since it in no way corre-
sponds with commercial practice, would serve no useful purpose. [Com-
ments 2-4 not included].
For similar reasons, filing is not permitted as to money. Perfection of
security interests in certificated securities, which are covered by the def-
inition of instruments, is governed by Section 8-321 and, therefore, ex-
cluded from this section.
207. U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978) provided:
§ 9-309. Protection of Purchasers of Instruments, Documents and
Securities
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument (Section 3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-501) or a bona fide
purchaser of a security (Section 8-302) and the holders or purchasers
take priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected. Fil-
ing under this Article does not constitute notice of the security interest
to such holders or purchasers.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 9(a), Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act.
Purposes:
1. Under this Article as at common law and under prior statutes the
rights of purchasers of negotiable paper, including negotiable documents
of title and investment securities, are determined by the rules of holding
in due course and the like which are applicable to the type of paper con-
cerned. (Articles 3, 7, and 8.) This section, as did Section 9(a) of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, makes explicit the rule which was implicitly
but universally recognized under the earlier statutes.
208. U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978).
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provision seems to work to create a seamless whole that provided a set
of rules to cover the subject matter. To be a "holder" meant possession
was essential, 20 9 and to be a perfected secured party also required
possession and made possession essential to that status.2 10 Thus, the
victory went to the possessor by virtue of section 9-309.211
The same basic rule applies in favor of a purchaser of other instru-
ments who claims priority against a proceeds interest therein of which
he-or she has knowledge. Thus, a purchaser of a negotiable instru-
ment might prevail under clause (b) even though the purchaser's
knowledge of the conflicting proceeds claim precluded the purchaser
having holder in due course status under section 9-309. Both the ele-
gance and unwavering nature of the rule that is embodied in the for-
mer rules is admirable. It constructed a Code that reinforced what a
good commercial lawyer would advise, "grab the paper and hold onto
it." In this way it recognized history and commercial practice, as well
as providing an accessible lesson for students.
So why the drastic change in the scheme worked by the 2000
amendments? Here is a Drafter's comment suggestive of an answer:
Under subsection (a), a security interest in instruments may be perfected by
filing. This rule represents an important change from former Article Nine,
which under the secured party's taking possession of an instrument was the
only method of achieving long-term perfection. The rule is likely to be particu-
larly useful in transactions involving a large number of notes that a debtor
uses as collateral but continues to collect from the makers. A security interest
perfected by filing is subject to defeat by certain subsequent purchasers (in-
209. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2000).
210. Id. § 9-304(1) (2000).
211. Even the complementary provision dealing with chattel paper and instruments
was a part of this programmatic solution. U.C.C. § 9-308 (1978) provided:
§ 9-308. Purchase of Chattel Paper and Instruments
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value
and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has pri-
ority over a security interest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and
temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to
proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific paper or
instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a se-
curity interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that the spe-
cific paper or instrument is subject to the security interest.
Official Comment
2. Although perfection by filing is permitted as to chattel paper, cer-
tain purchasers of chattel paper allowed to remain in the debtor's pos-
session take free of the security interest despite the filing.
Clause (b) of the section deals with the case where the security inter-
est in the chattel paper is claimed merely as proceeds - i.e., on behalf of
an inventory financier who has not by some new transaction with the
debtor acquired a specific interest in the chattel paper. In that case a
purchaser, even though he knows of the inventory financier's proceeds
interest, takes priority provided he gives new value and takes possession
of the paper in the ordinary course of his business.
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cluding secured parties). Under section 9-330(d), purchasers for value who
take possession of an instrument without knowledge that the purchase vio-
lates the rights of the secured party generally would achieve priority over a
security interest in the instrument perfected by filing. In addition, section 9-
331 provides that filing a financing statement does not constitute notice that
would preclude a subsequent purchaser from becoming a holder in due course
and taking free of all claims under section 3-306.212
The scope of the change is self-evident, but lets be explicit about its
significance as well. A security interest in negotiable instruments can
now be perfected by filing.2 13 Yet, the rest remains the same. A
holder in due course is still a holder who meets the special test of Arti-
cle Three,214 and a holder in due course still defeats any perfected
security interest.2 15 In other words, the change reiterates Gilmore's
observation that there are many places in Article Nine where priority
is not the same as perfection.216 Perhaps this is just another instance,
but other than the reference to the fairly specialized financing ar-
rangement mentioned in the comments to section 9-312 alone, there is
no explanation offered.
Why such a sharp break from the clear and programmatic former
Code logic? What was broken that needed to be fixed? The Drafters
saw fit only to hint at their purposes, but look at the identification of
the only competitor who now suffers defeat at the hands of a creditor
whose interest is completely ineffective against any perfected Article
Nine financier.2 17 Within this group of competitors, only the bank-
ruptcy trustee is that significant competitor. Only the trustee is
beaten by this quasi-perfected secured party. This can be referred to
as quasi-perfection because it is meaningless against all purchasers
and holders who meet the test of Article Nine purchasers. 2 18 Even
other financiers can defeat this quasi-perfection by taking possession,
in good faith, for value, and after meeting the other requirements of
"purchase" under Article Nine. In other words, a financier need not be
a holder in due course to defeat this filed interest. One only need be a
good faith purchaser in possession. 2 19 Take note that this filing does
not necessarily constitute notice of the defense or claim. Then this
competitor could even be a holder in due course and thus entitled to
212. U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 2 (2000).
213. Id. § 9-312(a) (2000).
214. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1978).
215. U.C.C. § 9-331 (2000).
216. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
217. There is no suggestion in the comments of what was not working properly under
the old code, instead the code speaks of ease and efficiency in large scale transac-
tions involving paper financing where the paper is left in the possession of the
debtor. U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 2 (2000).
218. See U.C.C. § 9-331(a) (2000).
219. U.C.C. § 9-330 (2000).
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the separate priority treatment for interests outside of Article
Nine.2 20
While the reason offered for the change is weak, if not implausible,
the damage done to Code logic is significant. Article Three thought-
fully builds the elements and structure for a holder in due course and
those elements and structure strongly suggest, if not compel, the con-
clusion that the holder in due course should be a victor where the com-
petitor is the run-of-the-mill security interest attaching to the
instrument as proceeds. Even Article Nine seems to accept this as an
unchallenged predicate. Surely there would have been a great hue
and cry had there been a suggestion of a change in this fundamental
doctrine of holder in due course in the redraft of Article Three. Yet,
there is a risk that an unselfconscious change has been wrought. The
combination of allowing a filing to perfect security interests in negoti-
able instruments and the deeply conflicted test of knowledge of com-
peting claims used to destroy holder in due course status may work to
do more than just make perfection easier in "bulk" transactions as the
Comment to the new Article Nine suggests. 22 1
Section 9-309 in the former Article Nine22 2 helped to explain why
simple notice of a security interest filing was inadequate and should
continue to be inadequate. First, filing only suggested the existence of
an interest not a present claim. Second, filing suggested no violation
of the prior security interest. These comments suggest the holder in
due course is protected because of value generated in the purchase of
the commercial paper assets.
This is illustrated by a simple hypothetical. Assume that Camera-
land, the debtor, and First National Bank, the secured party, enter
into a security agreement. The security agreement between these two
parties, subjects all the inventory of Cameraland, both present and
after acquired property, to the security interest and also covers all
proceeds of the inventory. No specific interest in promissory notes is
contemplated or bargained for except as proceeds of the inventory.
Any interest by First National Bank in promissory notes has to be
seen as a derivative or proceeds interest. After First National Bank
has perfected its security interest, Second State Bank enters the pic-
ture as a specialist lender in accounts receivable and promissory
notes. Cameraland receives capital from Second State Bank by "dis-
counting" (selling) to First National Bank the accounts receivable and
promissory notes given to it by its customers. For simplicity, assume
that Second State Bank paid ninety percent of the value of these
220. See U.C.C. § 9-331(c) (2000). Subsection (a) of section 9-331 makes reference to
rights for holders and others arising out or Articles 3, 7, and 8. Subsection (c)
states the rule of no limitation on those rights.
221. See U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 2 (2000).
222. U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 2 (1978).
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notes, did so in good faith, and took possession expecting to collect
them in due course. Under Article Three, past and present, and under
the former Article Nine, the critical issue was the state of Second
State Bank's level of notice or knowledge about First National Bank's
interest.22 3 Essentially, Article Three gave the victory to Second
State Bank so long as it did not have "knowledge," actual or attributa-
ble, of the interest of First National Bank. For this purpose, the pub-
lic filing of First National Bank was not enough to give this
knowledge. The cases were not in absolute agreement, but there was
near consensus that notification by filing, sometimes called construc-
tive notice, was insufficient. 2 24
Former section 1-201(25) through (27),225 now codified as section
1-202,226 differentiate among "actual knowledge," "receiving notice,"
and having "reason to know." Notice encompassed all three but actual
knowledge was subjective and narrower. 227 The upshot of this was
that it took fairly explicit and specific information about the security
interest of the senior creditor such as First National Bank, for Second
State Bank to lose its holder in due course status. Public filing, that is
constructive notice, was almost certainly not enough to give "notice of
claim,"228 as required to defeat holder in due course status. 229 Simple
knowledge, what is sometimes referred to as direct notice, as opposed
to public or attributed notice, of the competing interest might be
enough in limited circumstances. 23 0 However, the termination of
holder in due course status generally occurs because there was knowl-
edge or notice of the interest, coupled with some type of advantage
taking such as double-dealing or misrepresentation by the debtor.23 1
223. The issue is the state of knowledge at the time when the Second State Bank satis-
fied or attempted to satisfy the elements of holding in due course, and the critical
time is when the instrument is issued or negotiated to the holder. U.C.C. § 3-
302(a) (2002). Notice that the "without notice" requirement of (b) is conjunctive
making negotiation the critical time for both. In other words, a holder could
learn damaging information after having acquired the note by negotiation and
having met the other elements, and it would be too late to affect holder in due
course status.
224. See, e.g., infra note 282: see also LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT
SYSTEMS 86-87 (1997) (discussing tests used by courts to determine if a person
has reason to know of an infirmity to notice).
225. U.C.C. § 1-201 (25)-(27) (1978).
226. U.C.C. § 1-202 (2001).
227. Id.
228. See infra note 282.
229. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002).
230. See McCook County Nat'l. Bank v. Compton 558 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1977)
(finding either no direct notice or a case of forgotten notice under the code, but
noting that direct notice of a superior interest might under other circumstances
be sufficient to destroy holder in due course status).
231. See In re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d 1554, 1560-62 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the holder failed to satisfy the good faith requirement by its 'objective lack of good
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The heightened level of notice that was required to destroy the
holder in due course had the effect of ameliorating the power of the
secured transaction and gave the buyer of the commercial paper a bet-
ter shot at victory. 2 3 2 To accomplish this amelioration, the former
Code sections reiterated that notice by the filing of a financing state-
ment was not enough.2 33 In addition, sections 9-308 and 9-309 oper-
ated as a package in this context to expand and complement one
another. For instance, remember that for First National Bank to have
a "perfected" security interest it had to have possession under the for-
mer Code.234 Second, section 9-308 made it clear that temporary
perfection was permitted in only very unusual circumstances and
perfection by virtue of proceeds filings were ineffective against a jun-
ior purchaser who gave the value and took possession. A fortiori, a
holder in due course would easily have triumphed even with knowl-
edge. Here, is the resolution to the troublesome problem of differenti-
ating levels of knowledge. Absent a direct interest, that is a non-
proceeds security interest in the instruments held by the senior se-
cured party, the senior lost to the holder in due course. Even one who
had knowledge and might not technically be a holder in due course
could still met the abbreviated test of value and good faith under sec-
tion 9-308. Here the value was the equivalent of that needed to be a
purchaser or buyer in the ordinary course of business.
Was Article Nine more "generous" than Article Three? The answer
is no, rather it simply reiterated a consistent Code logic of rewarding
the purchaser of an asset, even one held as security by a prior per-
fected secured party for other and overriding commercial purposes.
Purchasers generate cash and cash is the only way in which the per-
fected senior secured party will be repaid. It is easy to forget that the
perfected security interest is not the "end." It is the "means" and col-
lateral, literally and figuratively, to the end of being repaid the loan
amount. So, for the Drafters of the former Article Nine, logic must
have dictated that this be viewed as just another version of their basic
theme: It is not perfection that is the issue, because both interests are
perfected, rather it is the relative priority of these two perfected inter-
ests. Article Nine gave to the new value purchaser,235 a priority simi-
faith in failing to take steps to investigate that it had taken in other transactions
with other companies; by doing so it was consciously or unconsciously taking ad-
vantage of its own ignorance); see also Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc, v. Familian, 905
P.2d 506, 510 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a similar issue of conscious advan-
tage taking, but ultimately finding none).
232. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, 309 (1972).
233. U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978).
234. Id. § 9-304 (1978) (filing versus possession and possession required for negotiable
instruments).
235. U.C.C. § 9-308 (1978); U.C.C. § 9-330 (2000).
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lar to that given to the buyer in the ordinary course, 23 6 because both
contemplated the availability of new value.237
On the other hand, Article Three, which in the abstract might
seem more likely to be friendly toward the holder in due course since
that Article is the home of the Code concept,238 is at first glance actu-
ally less friendly.239 This difference is due to the very different logic of
Article Three.
The very powerful concept of holder in due course is designed to
favor the free exchange of commercial paper. Consider the above hy-
pothetical again. Second State Bank is given the extraordinary status
of holder in due course because it is the stated policy of Article Three
to make the paper created by the makers and drawers of that paper
flow freely in commerce, 2 40 in effect increasing their credit opportuni-
ties at the risk of cutting off some of their defenses and claims.2 41 In
addition, the truly distant and disinterested financier such as Second
State Bank can confidently cut off ownership claims by those who may
have financed the business and taken an interest in the paper.24 2
Those in the position of First National Bank, competitors whose
"claims" are in the nature of security interests, must lose if they had
neither possession nor gave direct notice of its claim. To do this, Arti-
cle Three wraps up title with possession for a stronger admixture than
the simple security interest or lien.243 It is the holder in due course
who not only gives new value, but takes possession, thereby defeating
all other claimants.2 44
This powerful mixture of historical policy, historical practice, and
commercial reason had limits. First, there were the real defenses. In-
stances in which the makers and drawers (customers) might be de-
frauded in the most egregious circumstances were allowed some
defenses, which are referred to as real defenses.245 When a real de-
fense exists the holder's needs are far less appealing. The commercial
issue is why protect a holder who was not distant and disinter-
ested,24 6 or even was aware that the cheating was occurring.2 47
236. U.C.C. § 9-307 (1978); U.C.C. § 9-320 (2000).
237. U.C.C. § 9-320 (2000) (purchaser who gives new value); Id. § 1-201(9) (2000)
(buyer in ordinary course). To be a buyer in the ordinary course requires new
value and the taking of possession. This is because to be a "buyer in the ordinary
course" one must be a buyer and to buy one must buy for "cash" or other new
value and may not buy "in bulk" or for satisfaction of a preexisting debt. Id..
238. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002).
239. See id.
240. See U.C.C. § 3-302 cmt. 4 (2002).
241. See id. §§ 3-305, -306 (2002).
242. See id. § 3-305.
243. Id. § 3-302 cmt. 4 (2002).
244. Id. § 3-305.
245. Id. § 3-305 cmt. 1.
246. Id. § 3-305 cmt. 3.
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These are very different issues from priority concerns of Article Nine
and should be cared for within Article Three. Holders in due course
are protected because of their special qualities. If these special quali-
ties are not present, their status reverts to the status of a mere trans-
feree subject to claims, defenses, and claims in recoupment, as would
be any other transferee of a contract right. With insulation stripped
away, the holder in due course is simply a transferee who takes all of
the inherent risks of the transaction. The negotiable instrument 248
might as well have been a simple contract or account receivable if the
transferee is not a holder in due course. 24 9
E. The Cases Struggle to Integrate Holders with Secured
Parties
It is helpful to examine a group of cases to see how the unitary
concept of holder in due course status by the 2000 Revision was bifur-
cated. In these opinions, the courts struggled with the nature of no-
tice and knowledge, especially in the context of notice of a competitor's
security interest and how that affected holder in due course status to
negotiable instruments. Almost all of these cases involve the second
and related issue of the relative priority given to the parties in Article
Nine where the holder in due course may have known or had actual
notice of the competitor's security interest.
These cases are divided into two groups. In the first group are
cases in which the critical decision is made with reference to Article
Three and the general concepts of holder in due course, that the trans-
feree takes in good faith and without notice of the defenses and claims.
In this group there are no significant concerns for the Article Nine
priority scheme. 2 50 The second group is the smaller, but very power-
ful set of cases in which the courts attempt to deal not only with the
holder in due course concept and issues of notice, but also with the
Article Nine priority rules. 25 1
247. Id.
248. See id. § 3-104 (2002).
249. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (2000); U.C.C. §§ 9-403, -404 (2000) (discussing rights and
duties of account receivable transferees).
250. "Significant," as it is used here, means that there must be more than just passing
references to the 1972 Code sections 9-308 and 9-309, which set out the secured
transaction priorities.
251. Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1991); McCook
County Nat'l Bank v. Compton, 558 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1977); Fin. Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc. v. Familian Corp., 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); N. Cent. Kansas Prod.
Credit Ass'n. v. Boese, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 179 (D. Kan. 1976); Farns Assocs. Inc.
v. S. Side Bank, 417 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Bowles v. City Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 537 P.2d 1219 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Frigiking, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App. 1985).
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The Fourth Circuit case of Allstate Financial Corp. v. Financorp,
Inc.252 is representative of the first group of cases. In this case Kane,
the debtor, received a loan from Allstate and in return gave Allstate a
security interest in and right to purchase proceeds of Kane's delivery
business. 253 Later, Financorp loaned money to Kane and took an as-
signment of a specific account receivable. Laidlaw, the account
debtor, made periodic payments to Kane and some of those checks
were endorsed to Financorp. 25 4 All the evidence at trial showed that
Financorp had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, 2 55 of All-
state's interest. Allstate argued that the filing alone was notice of its
claim. This was quickly rejected.2 56 The court rightly determined
that nothing in Article Three precludes a junior lien holder from also
being a holder in due course.2 57 The court concluded that Article
Nine's priority rules were not controlling given the holder's status as a
holder in due course. 2 58 The court reasoned that the plain language of
Article Nine is to give priority to a junior lien holder if he or she is a
holder in due course under Article Three.2 59
The Eighth Circuit reached the same result in the McCook County
National Bank v. Compton.260 Without even mentioning section 9-
309, the court determined that the bank that "cashed" the check
claimed the check as a genuine holder in due course.2 6 1 Even knowl-
edge of the senior secured party's perfection did not give the holder
bank notice of the defense or notice of the senior's claim to the
check. 2 62 The senior's filing alone was not enough. 26 3
To a similar effect was Farns Associates, Inc. v. Southside Bank,264
where the court held that the secured party had a superior interest in
check proceeds of accounts receivable, but did so on the limited ground
252. Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1991).
253. Id. 934 F.2d at 57.
254. Id. at 57.
255. Id. at 58-59.
256. Id. at 59.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 61.
259. Id.
260. McCook County Nat'l Bank v. Compton, 558 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1977).
261. Id. at 876.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 876-77. This is similar to the holding in North Central Kansas Production
Credit Association v. Boese, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 179 (D. Kan. 1976).
There the court noted that the hotel cashing the PCA check was more knowledge-
able than the typical holder, but still a holder. Id. The court followed what ap-
pears to be the minority rule of pure subjective knowledge rather than the
excitement-to-inquiry rule of a reasonable person. Id. at 184. The court saw no
basis for an inquiry by the PCA where even the existence of a security interest
was speculative. Id. at 184-85 (filing alone was not sufficient.)
264. Farns Associates, Inc. v. S. Side Bank, 417 N.E.2d 818, 823-24 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981).
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that the bank failed its test of holder in due course as there was not a
proper endorsement by the debtor. Accordingly, it was not knowledge
or notice that destroyed the special status, but rather a simple failure
in the steps needed for proper negotiation that left the secured party
with priority as to the identifiable proceeds and left the holder in due
course in the position of a mere contractual claimant.2 65
One of only two cases cited in the comments to new section 9-331 is
Financial Management Services, Inc. v. Familian, Corp.2 6 6 In this
case, FMSI financed a group of customers of a supplier known as Sta-
pley Wholesale.267 Using a series of promissory notes and security
agreements, FMSI provided financing to a plumbing business, Pima
Plumbing Contractors (Pima).268 Stapley gave a guarantee of full
payment on the accounts that Pima used as collateral. This allowed
Stapley's account customers to buy from Pima on credit. FMSI be-
came the financier with Pima taking up the promise of the individual
customers through their guarantee of payment. 269 FMSI filed its fi-
nancing statement in 1986.270 In 1988, Pima entered into another fi-
nancing arrangement with Familian, who sold Pima materials and
supplies and also took a security interest in its accounts receivable. 2 7 1
After learning of a large payment to FMSI in August 1989, Familian
negotiated with Pima an arrangement in which the debt to Familian
would be reduced over time.27 2 They jointly notified the accounts
debtors to make all further payments as joint payee checks to
Familian and Pima together. Between September 25th and November
30th, 1989, payments totaling a little over $1.1 million were received.
The debt was reduced by some $300,000 and about $800,000 was re-
mitted to Pima. 273 In the meantime, on September 20th, a copy of
FMSI's filing statement showed up in a search report. 27 4 When FMSI
learned of the joint payment arrangement, it first requested that Sta-
pley repurchase the Pima accounts involved in the joint payment
checks.2 75 Stapley was not able to do so. 2 76 Its financial condition
continued to worsen during this time, although it was not evident to
the two outside parties. 2 77 FMSI then sued Familian, claiming the
superior right to the approximately $350,000 received in joint
265. Id. at 823-24.
266. Fin. Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Familian Corp., 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1995).












checks.2 78 Familian defended claiming holder in due course status in
the checks.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found
Familian to be a holder in due course. 2 79 The court applied a subjec-
tive good faith test and found no dishonesty or bad faith in Familian's
knowledge of FMSI's security interest and the surrounding circum-
stances.280 Familian was not aware that Pima was in trouble finan-
cially,2 8 ' only that it had been slow to pay. This was an observation
that could have been made about most of Pima's industry at the
time.28 2 In an interesting collapse of the notice of claim question into
that of good faith,283 the court applied the actual knowledge test for
defense or claim with the addition of the duty to inquire upon knowl-
edge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to inquire into the
defense or claim.2 84
The court's decision that knowledge of the senior secured party's
claim was not present has found its way into permanent Editorial
Board Commentary Number 7.285 In fact, the court seemed to say
that without knowledge of a "violation" of the security agreement by
Pima or knowledge of the default on the FMSI security agreement by
Pima, Familian knew of no claim by FMSI.286 Knowledge of the prior
security agreement did not, alone, give Familian reason to inquire fur-
ther about violations that might lead to FMSI being more of a
claimant.28 7
The Drafters of the revised section 9-331 which replaced section 9-
309, did not disapprove of Familian.28 8 The Drafters cryptically
observed,
Whether the junior secured party qualifies as a holder in due course is fact-
sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of those
circumstances. Decisions such as Financial Management Services, Inc. v.
278. Familian, 905 P.2d at 509.
279. Familian, 905 P.2d at 514.
280. Id. at 511-12.
281. Id. at 513.
282. Id. at 508-09
283. Id. at 511-512.
284. Id. at 512.
285. Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, Com-
mentary No. 7, in 3B UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 626 (March 10, 1990); see also
Familian, 905 P.2d at 512. The Familian court stated as a flat rule, knowledge of
existence of a senior lienholder is inadequate. Id. Add to this two further cases
with similar holdings. Bowles v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 537 P.2d 1219,
1222 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Dallas Bank & Trust. Co. v. Frigiking, Inc., 692
S.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
286. Familian, 905 P.2d at 513.
287. Id.
288. U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2000).
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Familian could be determined differently under this application of the good-
faith requirement. (citation omitted)2 8 9
The other case cited in the comments to section 9-331 is In re Joe
Morgan, Inc.290 In this case, Sunburst Bank had a perfected security
interest in the accounts of Joe Morgan, Incorporated (hereinafter
"JMI").291 To secure its revolving credit line Sunburst filed a security
interest covering equipment, general intangibles, and accounts receiv-
ables.29 2 Although the loan was made in October 1988, the filing to
perfect was not made until March 15, 1989.293 Because of poor per-
formance the loan was quickly downgraded, Sunburst informed JMI
that no new credit would be extended and that JMI should find other
financing.294 JMI found Utility Contractors Financial Services (here-
inafter "UCON"), a newly formed Nevada corporation created to
purchase accounts receivable from telephone utility contractors. 295
UCON agreed to purchase JMI's accounts receivable at a five percent
discount from the face value and began the factoring in March or April
of 1989.296 Although Sunburst's financing statement was on record,
the principal investor of UCON, who was new to factoring and did not
know about searching Article Nine filings, was without direct knowl-
edge of Sunburst's interest.2 97 On July 17th, 1989, there was a
chance meeting between the agents of Sunburst and the principal of
UCON.298 Some misunderstandings and vague understandings led to
an agreement that UCON would continue to factor through August
1989.299 JMI used the UCON funds to meet payroll and its then cur-
rent expenses, but it was known to both of the financiers that addi-
tional receivables would be needed to cover the loans to UCON and
Sunburst.30 0 Approximately $2.5 million in accounts had been fac-
tored by UCON and almost $850,000 of that amount came after its
direct knowledge of Sunburst's interest.301 The bankruptcy court
found that the earlier $1.65 million was not in controversy, as UCON
was indisputably a holder in due course until the July 17th meet-
289. Id. § 9-331 (2000).
290. In re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993) was a decision in an adver-
sary proceeding in the larger Joe Morgan bankruptcy case.
291. In re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d at 1555-56.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1555-56.
294. Id. at 1556.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1556.
297. Id.
298. Id.




ing.30 2 As to the later $850,000 the court considered two issues: (1)
whether UCON was a holder in due course and (2) whether estoppel
might prevent Sunburst's assertion of an interest.30 3
Stepping through the requirements of section 3-302 for holder in
due course status, 30 4 the court quickly got to the crux of the issue at
hand, whether the holder in due course took in good faith and without
notice. 30 5 First, it is important to note that the Eleventh Circuit court
observed that Alabama courts were not in the majority,30 6 at least not
at that time.30 7 The Alabama courts applied a compound test of good
faith.308 To be in good faith, the holder must be both honest-in-fact
and not possessed of such knowledge or facts as to amount to a lack of
good faith. Some have called this "objective" bad faith burying one's
head in the sand or "turning a blind eye."30 9 The issue is not, how-
ever, one of notice alone.310 That requirement is separate in the sec-
tion 3-302 requirement of lack of notice. Instead, the requirement is
one of "fair dealing."3 11 With the revised definition of good faith in
302. In re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993). Note that the public
filing alone was insufficient to destroy the good faith of UCON or to give it notice
of Sunburst's claim.
303. Id. at 1558.
304. Of little relevance here, but of great interest on policy argument grounds to be
discussed below, is the finding of value. The court determined that UCON had
given value for the checks by acquiring them by negotiation from the individual
account debtors. Id. at 1559-60. Each holder must have value in his or her own
right. U.C.C. § 3-303 (2000). Here, JMI clearly was owed the money for services
rendered. This created the account. Next, the check was taken in payment of
this antecedent debt. The issue though is whether UCON acquired the assign-
ment as a chance at recovery on an account that remained the property of JMI, or
whether UCON acquired an assignment of the property interest of JMI. In re Joe
Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d at 1559-60. The Court determined the latter was closer to
reality. Id. UCON "purchased" the antecedent claim of JMI then took checks in
exchange for that claim owed by individual account debtors. Id. Although the
reasoning could have been clearer, UCON gave value. Id. The value given was
the loan amounts owed by JMI which were paid by negotiating the checks 95
cents on the dollar. Id at 1559. This is significant for two reasons. First, it
tracks the policy of Article Three that the holder in due course be a contributor of
value, not necessarily new value, but more than consideration, a genuine value so
that the extraordinary status of holder in due course is justified by value added to
the commercial world. U.C.C. § 3-303 cmt. 1 (2000). Second, by this standard the
new value was a validation of purchaser exaltation of the higher priority status of
buyer and purchaser found in Article Nine. See id. §§ 9-320, 9-330. These Article
Nine rules are predicated on the higher economic good created by value added to
the debtor's enterprise, which will likely increase the chance of repayment to the
secured party whose proceeds interests is lost. See id; see also infra notes 317-19.
305. In re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d 1554, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1993).
306. Id. at 1560.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1561-62; see also U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2000).
310. See cases cited supra note 282 and accompanying text.
311. 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 166-70 (4th ed. 1995).
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section 3-103(a)(7), the Alabama minority rule has now become the
statutory rule. To the extent that observation of reasonable commer-
cial standards covers the same ground as an objective judgment about
fair dealing, the tests have become one and the same. Section 3-
103(a)(7) is probably even broader and deeper though. It appears to
require more than willful blindness or choosing to ignore some con-
cern. Instead, it appears to go further by requiring actual observance
of reasonable standards of behavior in making an inquiry if an issue
arises even though there is not actual knowledge.31 2
Because of this evolution in the law of good faith under Article
Three, the use of the JMI case in the comments to section 9-331 with
something akin to approval makes sense. 3 13 The Comment focuses
almost exclusively on the role of good faith in the relationship of the
junior creditor to the senior creditor's pre-existing filed financing
statement.3 14 Moreover, the JMI court noted that with an objective
test of good faith "the good faith and notice elements of the holder in
due course test will frequently merge."3 15 While there is a vanishing
point where overlap obscures the differences between the two, they
are indeed different and the new comments to section 9-331 exacer-
bate the problem of differentiating them.
Likewise, a junior secured party who collects accounts when it knows or
should know under the particular circumstances that doing so would violate
the rights of a senior secured party, because the debtor had agreed not to
grant a junior security interest in, or sell, the accounts, may not meet the
good-faith test. Thus, if a junior secured party conducted or should have con-
ducted search and a financing statement filed on behalf of the senior secured
party states such a restriction, the junior's collection would not meet the good-
faith standard. On the other hand, if there was a course of performance be-
tween the senior secured party and the debtor which placed no such restric-
tions on the debtor and allowed the debtor to collect and use the proceeds
without any restrictions, the junior secured party may then satisfy the re-
quirements for being a holder in due course. 3 1 6
Frankly this is not particularly helpful. The issue is fair dealing.
Any notice given a junior secured party by the mere presence of a se-
nior financing statement is simply that he or she is junior. How likely
is it that the financing statement, which is required only to contain
three items, the name of secured party, the name of the debtor and a
description of the collateral, is going to specify something as elaborate
as the circumstances for sale of the account proceeds? What the com-
ments seem to suggest is that every secured party would be benefited
312. Id. at 170-77.
313. U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2000).
314. Id. §§ 9-102(43) and 3-103(4) (2000) are in agreement that good faith is now ob-
jective in the relevant settings of secured transactions (Article Nine) and com-
mercial paper (Article Three).
315. Morgan, 985 F.2d at 1562.
316. U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2000).
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by adding such a technical phrase to the financing statement to assure
that later junior secured parties cannot become holders in due course.
And if it was the intent of the Drafters to encourage this practice, why
should Article Nine suggest and foster this preemptive strike through
the financing statement? It seems out of line with other basic princi-
ples of Article Nine, including the buyer in the ordinary course test of
section 9-320. In that section, the buyer must be aware of a violation
of the secured party's financing rights and that requirement dovetails
nicely with the authorized disposition of inventory mentioned in sec-
tion 9-315(a)(1):
[Disposition of collateral: continuation of security interest or agricultural lien;
proceeds.] Except as otherwise provided in this article and in section 2-403(2):
(1) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwith-
standing sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the
secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agri-
cultural lien .... 317
The comments add:
For example, the general rule does not apply, and a security interest does not
continue in collateral, if the secured party authorized disposition, in the
agreement that contains the security agreement or otherwise ... likewise, the
general rule that a security interest survives disposition does not apply if the
secured party entrusts goods collateral to a merchant who deals in goods of
that kind and the merchant sells the collateral to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. 3 1
8
In other words, when the prior lien creditor "purchases," he or she
gives value sufficient to become a holder in due course, which used to
be treated as the equivalent of a new value purchaser in the buyer in
the ordinary course situation.3 19 Only the circumstance stated in the
second part of the comment offer insight into the original, but rapidly
disappearing commercial logic:
Generally, the senior secured party would not be prejudiced because the prac-
tical effect of such payment to the junior secured party is little different than
if the debtor itself had made collections and subsequently paid the secured
party from the debtor's general funds. Absent collusion, the junior secured
party would take the funds free of the senior security interests. In contrast,
the senior secured party is likely to be prejudiced if the debtor is going out of
business and the junior secured party collects the accounts by notifying the
account debtors to make payments directly to the junior. Those collections
may not be consistent with "reasonable commercial standards for fair
dealing. 3 2 0
This is truly bad faith. Where collusion or intentional disadvantaging
are present the party should not be given a superior right.321
317. Id. § 9-315(a)(1) (2000).
318. Id. 9-315 cmt. 2.
319. Buyers in the ordinary course are the clear models for the purchasers found in
the former Article Nine provisions. See U.C.C. §§ 9-308, -309 (1978).
320. U.C.C. § 9-331, cmt. 5 (2000) (citation omitted).
321. Id.
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The problem with the fifth Comment to section 9-331 is that it waf-
fles. First, it waffles between the efficacy of knowledge based on a
search,322 then it waffles on the requirement of knowledge of
"prejudice" to the senior secured creditor.323 Second, and even worse,
the Comment encourages courts to waffle between extreme and discor-
dant positions. The section states the classic, and what had been
clear, rule: notice by filing "does not constitute notice of a claim or
defense."324 The Comment, without referencing this distinction, col-
lapses the "notice" discussion into considerations of "good faith."
Again, this is suggested by the recent change to the objective test of
good faith now included within the new provision. 3 25 Yet, it does a
disservice to those courts attempting to sort out the effect of actual
knowledge of a predecessor security interest. Is simple notice destruc-
tive or must it be coupled with something more? The former state-
ment of the rule is classic holder in due course doctrine. Notice that
simple knowledge of an adverse claim was enough. Actual knowledge
or notice in a number of ways.
On the other hand, a filing alone would not do any damage because
it was not direct knowledge of the filing and not deemed to be knowl-
edge of the secured party's interest, unless it was also known by the
junior secured party. It was actual knowledge of the filing, that is
direct knowledge, that did the damage in the classic formulation.326
322. The Comment reads:
Consider, for example, a junior secured party in the business of financ-
ing or buying accounts who fails to undertake a search to determine the
existence of prior security interests. Because a search, under the usages
of trade of that business, would enable it to know or learn upon reasona-
ble inquiry that collecting the accounts violated the rights of a senior
secured party, the junior may fail to meet the good-faith standard.
Id. § 9-331, cmt. 5.
323. The Comment states:
On the other hand, if there was a course of performance between the
senior secured party and the debtor which placed no such restrictions on
the debtor and allowed the debtor to collect and use the proceeds without
any restrictions, the junior secured party may then satisfy the require-
ments for being a holder in due course. This would be more likely in
those circumstances where the junior secured party was providing addi-
tional financing to the debtor on an on-going basis by lending against or
buying the accounts and had no notice of any restrictions against doing
so. Generally, the senior secured party would not be prejudiced because
the practical effect of such payment to the junior secured party is little
different than if the debtor itself had made the collections and subse-
quently paid the secured party from the debtor's general funds.
Id. § 9-331, cmt. 5.
324. Id. § 9-331(c); see also U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978).
325. U.C.C. § 9-102(c) (2000) (referencing Article One for general definitions). Section
1-201(20) (2000) is both objective and subjective. In addition, negotiable instru-
ments have the same double layer definition as referenced in the rule. See id. § 3-
103(d) (2000).
326. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
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The Comment launches into good faith and fails to establish the im-
portant point that even direct knowledge of a filing should be inade-
quate when moved from holder in due course doctrine to Article Nine
doctrine. That is, instead of becoming more limiting in Article Nine,
conflicting notice and knowledge should have even less impact. This
was the former provision section 9-308.327 Even though largely car-
327. The language of U.C.C. sections 9-308, 9-309 (1978) is as follows:
§ 9-308. Purchase of Chattel Paper and Instruments
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value
and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has pri-
ority over a security interest in the chattel paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and
temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection as to
proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific paper or
instrument is subject to a security interest; or
(b) which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a se-
curity interest (Section 9-306) even though he knows that the spe-
cific paper or instrument is subject to the security interest.
Official Comment
2. Although perfection by filing is permitted as to chattel paper, cer-
tain purchasers of chattel paper allowed to remain in the debtor's pos-
session take free of the security interest despite the filing.
Clause (b) of the section deals with the case where the security inter-
est in the chattel paper is claimed merely as proceeds - i.e., on behalf of
an inventory financier who has not by some new transaction with the
debtor acquired a specific interest in the chattel paper. In that case a
purchaser, even though he knows of the inventory financier's proceeds
interest, takes priority provided he gives new value and takes possession
of the paper in the ordinary course of his business.
The same basic rule applies in favor of a purchaser of other instru-
ments who claims priority against a proceeds interest therein of which
he has knowledge. Thus a purchaser of a negotiable instrument might
prevail under clause (b) even though his knowledge of the conflicting
proceeds claim precluded his having holder in due course status under
Section 9-309.
§ 9-309. Protection of Purchasers of Instruments, Documents and
Securities
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument (Section 3-302) or a holder to whom a negotiable
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-501) or a bona fide
purchaser of a security (Section 8-302) and the holders or purchasers
take priority over an earlier security interest even though perfected. Fil-
ing under this Article does not constitute notice of the security interest
to such holders or purchasers.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 9(a), Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act.
Purposes:
1. Under this Article as at common law and under prior statutes the
rights of purchasers of negotiable paper, including negotiable documents
of title and investment securities, are determined by the rules of holding
in due course and the like which are applicable to the type of paper con-
cerned. (Articles 3, 7, and 8.) This section, as did Section 9(a) of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, makes explicit the rule which was implicitly
but universally recognized under the earlier statutes.
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ried forward in the revised section 9-331 the new version seems
blunted or even lost in the new commentary. 3 28
Since the senior secured party would almost always be asserting a
proceeds interest, only direct knowledge of the interest, for instance
by stamping the paper with a notice of the property claim, would have
destroyed the protection of a purchaser under the former section 9-
308. In this way, section 9-308 clearly offered even broader protection
than was found in the section 9-309 adoption of the holder in due
course doctrine. Why? The new value analogy to buyers in the ordi-
2. Under section 9-304(1) filing is ineffective to perfect a security in-
terest in instruments (including securities) except those instruments
which are part of chattel paper, and of course is ineffective to constitute
notice to subsequent purchasers. Although filing is permissible as a
method of perfection for a security interest in documents, this section
follows the policy of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in providing that the
filing does not constitute notice to purchasers.
328. The language of U.C.C. section 9-331 (2000) is as follows:
9-33 1. Priority of Rights of Purchasers of Instruments, Documents, and
Securities Under Other Articles; Priority of Interests in Financial
Assets and Security Entitlements Under Article 8.
(a) [Rights under Articles 3, 7, and 8 not limited.] This article does
not limit the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument,
a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negoti-
ated, or a protected purchaser of a security. These holders or purchasers
take priority over an earlier security interest, even if perfected, to the
extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8.
(b) [Protection under Article 8.] This article does not limit the rights
of or impose liability on a person to the extent that the person is pro-
tected against the assertion of a claim under Article 8.
(c) [Filing not notice.] Filing under this article does not constitute
notice of a claim or defense to the holders, or purchasers, or persons de-
scribed in subsections (a) and (b).
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-309.
2. "Priority." In some provisions, this Article distinguishes between
claimants that take collateral free of a security interest (in the sense
that the security interest no longer encumbers the collateral) and those
that take an interest in the collateral that is senior to a surviving secur-
ity interest. See, e.g., Section 9-317. Whether a holder or purchaser re-
ferred to in this section takes free or is senior to a security interest
depends on whether the purchaser is a buyer of the collateral or takes a
security interest in it. The term "priority" is meant to encompass both
scenarios, as it does in Section 9-330.
3. Rights Acquired by Purchasers. The rights to which this section
refers are set forth in sections 3-305 and 3-306 (holder in due course), 7-
502 (holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negoti-
ated), and 8-303 (protected purchaser). The holders and purchasers re-
ferred to in this section do not always take priority over a security
interest. See, e.g., Section 7-503 (affording paramount rights to certain
owners and secured parties as against holder to whom a negotiable docu-
ment of title has been duly negotiated). Accordingly, this section adds
the clause, "to the extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8" to former sec-
tion 9-309.
(Comments 4 and 5 not included).
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nary course and purchase money security interests is obvious. 32 9 A
purchaser and, a fortiori, the special party known as a holder in due
course will be one who takes the instruments for new value, which
could be pursued as proceeds in lieu of the paper proceeds he or she
took out of the debtor's enterprise. 330 So, there is cash available to
ameliorate the loss the senior secured party faced.
This then explains the other direction of the Comment's waffle.
The Comment is replete with references to "unfair" practices by the
junior secured party and these references amount to collusion to with-
draw funds from the debtor's failing enterprise.3 3 1 Even here, the
limp conclusion is that it "may not be consistent with 'reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing." 3 32 As a limiting concept on the
holder in due course doctrine, this substantial unfairness, collusion, or
bad faith inquiry is more than that necessary to terminate the status
of holder in due course carried here by Article Three doctrines. So this
is an unhelpful, even obfuscating, discussion of the collapsed good
faith and notice elements which only serves to induce courts to think
somehow that mere knowledge of a security interest might be both
destructive of both holder in due course status and the requirement of
good faith for the purchaser to be similar to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.
To make a case that the ordinary behavior of a junior secured cred-
itor who tries to take paper and become a holder in due course might
cross the line of bad faith, suggests to courts that it is, alone, knowl-
edge of the senior's claim, rather than the collusive behavior, that is
sanctioned. Simple knowledge, without collusion or an intent to
double-deal, should not flow back to destroy holder in due course sta-
tus in the competitive situation of multiple financiers. 33 3 Any con-
trary conclusion seems unsound. The Comments to section 9-331
would be a better fit in the section 9-330 discussion of subsection (d) of
that section. This general priority rule, which favors purchasers, is
the broad policy of Article Nine. In this, it is better suited to the
broader coverage of section 9-330.
329. For buyer in the ordinary course under the former code, see U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
(1972), and under the current code section see U.C.C. § 9-320 (2000). For a defi-
nition of buyer in the ordinary course that remains largely unchanged, see U.C.C.
§ 1-201(9) (2000).
330. U.C.C. § 9-308 (1978).
331. U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2000).
332. Id.
333. In re Halmar Distrib., Inc., 116 B.R. 328, 335 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990). A bit
stronger is the knowledge of the security interest, and the bank did not honor
payment to the senior secured party even though the bank itself did not offset the
loan in the proceeds check. See Case Credit Corp. v. Portales Nat'l Bank, 966
P.2d 1172 (N.M. 1998).
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Because of the peculiar history and mixed policy of Article Three's
holder in due course doctrine, that holder protection will be less useful
to most junior secured parties than will the purchaser protection ideas
introduced and fostered by the Article Nine based rules. One needs to
be more resistant of crushing the holder in due course status in the
competitive scenarios of Article Nine than one would be in Article
Three defense, claim, and counter claim situations. It is not the
maker seeking relief under Article Three against a distant and power-
ful commercial entity attempting to insulate itself from some cheat in
the original making of the note. Rather, it is two sophisticated and
relatively equal players in the commercial world vying for priority to
an asset which one or the other will take. In this setting, it is the
junior creditor who is adding value to the enterprise and who in doing
so takes possession of the paper against another secured party who
has only a proceeds interest or bulk exchange. This other secured
party can pursue the value, the proceeds introduced into the enter-
prise by the junior creditor, rather than the paper itself. The Code
ought to be more free in releasing the claim of that senior secured
party and in finding good faith in the junior where new value or at
least additional value substitutes for the proceeds.334
334. The following is a suggestion for a comment to § 9-331 that better integrates the
policies of Articles 3 and 9:
This section, is intended to clarify and add to the priority rules of § 9-330. That
section states it is subject to the rule in (a). Subsection (a) is intended to make it
clear that nothing in Article Nine should be seen as limiting the rights of a
Holder in Due Course of negotiable instruments, negotiable documents of title
and certain securities. While § 9-330 sets forth the rules of priority between se-
cured parties who do not take possession and those who as purchasers do take
possession, that section adds to that priority scheme by ensuring that neither
group will have a greater claim than a Holder in Due Course. In some cases the
holder may be both a holder and a junior secured party. As either, if this person
qualifies as both a purchaser and a holder, which ever is the broader protection
should be the rule. While it may seem complex, the intent is to simplify and this
should be the guiding principle in applying these interlocking sections. Even
though different case law and approaches have led to these complementary prin-
ciples of holding and purchasing the intent is to simplify concepts such as "notice
of a defense or claim" and one clear rule is that notice of a filing is not sufficient.
Similarly actual knowledge of the senior secured party as prior in time will not in
most cases affect holder or purchaser status so that the junior creditor may qual-
ify for protection under both § 9-330 and this section. However, should the junior
creditor's knowledge include information that would demonstrate commercial un-
fairness, collusion, intentional advantage taking or similar bad faith. (Good
Faith is defined in § 9-102(43). There can be no holder in due course status
where there is no good faith purchaser. If we accept as effective the idea that a
junior creditor can be a good faith purchaser or Holder in Due Course we must at
a minimum accept that what constitutes notice of claims and bad faith is fact
specific and dependent on the nature of the financial setting as well as the knowl-
edge of virtually every purchaser and holder that a senior secured party is likely
to exist. The purchaser or holder should be free to acquire the paper because of
the value added to the debtor's enterprise. This is similar to the § 9-320 concepts
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IV. SUMMARY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
While the unsettled nature of the case law under the former sec-
tions 9-308 and 9-309 justified clarification, the new sections lack
Code logic. What had been a unified logic of complementary provi-
sions giving the greatest possible, synergistic protection to the holder
or purchaser, has become much less forceful. The new rule of section
9-330(d) downplays the role of new value, but also comes frighteningly
close to making the issue turn on whether the purchaser is a holder in
due course. This seems too high a price to pay for the new and weakly
supported rule of perfection by filing. Despite the language of viola-
tion, which continues the gist of section 9-309, the new Comment to
section 9-330335 destroys this by allowing actual knowledge of the fi-
nancing statement to destroy the good faith requirement of purchaser.
Now, section 9-330 does not complement and expand section 9-331,336
instead it restricts section 9-331 by allowing both to be defeated by the
same knowledge of an interest asserted by the senior with no apparent
showing of violation of the security interest by the junior. By doing so,
the sections cut-back on both holder in due course 3 37 and on value
added purchasers. 338 Both lost the special status of priority against a
of buyers in the ordinary course and the § 9-315 authorized disposition principle.
The senior secured party is left with proceeds to pursue either through fresh
value or by the loosening of debt and the making of other assets available to the
debtor, the inherent function of a holder or purchaser for value. Here the connec-
tion to §9-332 and transfers of money should also be noted as reinforcing this
complementary priority scheme.
In an interesting irony, U.C.C. § 9-330(e) (2000) provides: "(e) [Holder of
purchase-money security interest gives new value.] For purposes of subsections
(a) and (b), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory gives
new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory."
This appears to be a novel expression. The provision, which was intended to
replace some of the ideas contained in the former 9-108 (1978), adds this innova-
tive gloss to the 9-103 definitions. It makes the point that "new value" can be
found in credit expansion.
335. U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 7 (2000) (discussing instruments and incorporating the test
of "knowledge" from having seen a statement in the financing statement of Com-
ment 6).
336. Former U.C.C. § 9-308 (1978) complemented and actually sharpened the tools
available to the holder under U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978).
337. The holder in due course protection is substantially narrowed by the loss of the
former provision, U.C.C. § 9-309 (1978) with its uncomplicated statement that
nothing in Article Nine was intended to interfere with the protections of Article
Three in the context of purchasers and holders.
338. Compare U.C.C. § 9-308 (1978) ("new value"), with the current U.C.C. § 9-330
(2000) ("value"). This actually works to restrict the protection offered by § 9-330
because while the new section increases the number of those who might qualify
and tracks the doctrine of "value" found in Article 3, it does so while lessening
dramatically the protections offered this broader class. Section 9-308 was much
friendlier to the purchaser competing with a mere proceeds secured party.
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secured party with an interest in the paper which interest is merely
the proceeds of the actual collateral.
What this accomplishes, aside from securing the position of the fin-
ancier who is first to file with regard to accounts, chattel paper, and
negotiable instruments is unclear. The rule now gives greater protec-
tion to the senior secured party in accounts receivable, chattel paper
and negotiable instruments than is given to the senior secured credi-
tor in inventory.33 9 The purchase money security interest can break
the inventory lender's monopoly with simple notice and a filing by the
purchase money party.3 40 Yet, the senior paper lender can tie up the
assets by making a specific statement of direct interest and non-re-
lease in its filed financing statement, which if seen or known to the
junior secured creditor will destroy "good faith."341 It is particularly
ironic that the new provisions work this change to make negotiable
instruments less "negotiable" than the inventory that is so often sold
to generate the instrument. This is a tremendous price to pay for this
small and greedy change of allowing a filed financing statement to
cover negotiable instruments. All done for the apparent purpose of
allowing the generic filing against "all personal property of the debtor"
to defeat the trustee in bankruptcy as to negotiable instruments held
in the estate. It is especially greedy given the nearly fantastic nature
of any claim of genuine reliance by the "bulk financier" of negotiable
instruments posited by the comment to section 9-312.342
V. CONCLUSION
It may be time for federal bankruptcy judges to dust off the text of
section 545 and revitalize its policy by calling these apparently con-
sensual security interests what they are. They are not genuine con-
sensual security interests, but rather liens, in the guise of security
interests created by state law, albeit uniform state law. They are
more akin to liens that are effective only in bankruptcy than they are
the commercially reasonable bargained for exchange that is the cen-
tral concept of Article Nine.34 3 It may also be time for us, as commer-
cial lawyers and academics, to renew the Code logic commitment of
Gilmore and the earlier Drafters and to seek the higher plan of com-
mercial reason. In the process of drafting and commenting on uniform
law, it has become too easy to answer the natural, but greedy call of
339. Compare U.C.C. § 9-330 (2000) with U.C.C. § 9-324 (2000).
340. Id. § 9-324(b) (2000).
341. Id. § 9-330, cmt. 6.
342. Id. § 9-312, cmt. 2.
343. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2. This is the same substance as the former U.C.C. § 9-102
(1978). The scope of Article Nine is "all consensual security interests in personal
property and fixtures." Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2.
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secured creditors to gather all the assets of the debtor no matter how
tenuous their reliance.
